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This study was designed to explore the viability of an alternative method of measuring 
affordability (the residual income method) to that of the ubiquitous 30 per cent 
benchmark method and to use this alternative method for enriching understanding 
around a range of affordability and housing market issues. The work has been 
exploratory but it does reveal both the potential and the limitations of the method. This 
Final Report was preceded by a Positioning Paper (Stone et al. 2011) which reviews 
the national and international literature on measuring housing affordability and 
outlines the methodology and assumptions behind the residual income method. 
Put simply, the residual income method calculates how much is left over for housing 
rents or mortgage after relevant expenditure items for different household types have 
been taken into account. If there is insufficient left for rents and mortgages after 
meeting this budget standard, a household has an affordability problem. The basis for 
formulating such a measure for Australia was enabled by the development of 
indicative budget standards by the Social Policy Research Centre (SPRC) at the 
University of New South Wales (Saunders et al. 1998). They established a low cost 
budget standard (LCBS) and a modest cost budget standard (MCBS); the former 
might be seen as a minimum level of consumption in contemporary Australia, while 
the latter allows for a comfortable but far from luxurious lifestyle. Both have been used 
in this study, but with most emphasis on the LCBS, and have been indexed to relevant 
years by a composite index of the CPI minus housing component and of disposable 
Income. 
This Final Report is not an exhaustive treatment of the residual income method but is 
designed to illustrate its potential, relative to benchmark methods, for understanding a 
number of housing affordability related issues. And, while the subject matter could 
potentially be quite technical and detailed, the report aims to minimise the detail and 
concentrate on understanding and exemplification. The report has a number of 
objectives. These are to: 
1. Use the residual income method to calculate the distribution of housing 
affordability in Australia in aggregate and for individual household types by tenure, 
income, state and other relevant variables in order to get some assessment of the 
scale and distribution of residual income affordability. This includes comparison 
with the ratio method, either the aggregate 30 per cent measure or the more 
targeted 30/40 ratio, that is, 30 per cent for the lowest 40 per cent of income 
earners. 
2. Compare these aggregate Australian findings with those for the USA, as 
representing a form of benchmark to assess how badly or well Australia performs 
in terms of affordability. 
3. Model the affordability capacity of case study households (single person, couple 
with two children) across a broad income range to provide a better understanding 
of how affordability constraints, as indicated by the residual income method, are 
potentially shaping the operation of housing markets. 
4. Illustrate using the Melbourne and Adelaide home purchase markets what the 
residual income method suggests about the performance of these housing 
markets in terms of affordability. 
5. Illustrate using the Melbourne rental market what the residual income method 
suggests about the performance of this housing market and associated 
submarkets in terms of affordability. 
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6. Test the appropriateness of the residual income method for social and affordable 
housing rent-setting policy and eligibility practices. 
These objectives have required their own sections in the report, with their own 
distinctive findings summarised in Section 8. However, the major findings or 
implications are: 
1. Appropriateness of the model. For a broad measure of affordability across all 
households, the residual income method provides results not too dissimilar to the 
benchmark method, but in terms of compositional elements where the results are 
affected by the type of household and their different expenditures it is likely to be 
more accurate as to what is the household experience. For example, it is obvious 
that large families will have more expenses than smaller ones and that this will 
affect their capacity to purchase or rent. 
2. For the households examined (representing about 75% of all Australian 
households), the residual income method (for the lowest 40% of income earners) 
shows a much higher incidence of affordability problems, 33.6 per cent using a 
LCBS, compared to 23.9 per cent by the 30/40 method. One reason why the 
30/40 disposable income rule is lower than the LCBS for those households in the 
lowest 40 per cent of income earners is that under 30/40 principles no social 
housing tenants have an affordability problem (it is defined away) where the LCBS 
identifies that most do so. The second is that outright owners, again by definition 
in the 30/40 rule, cannot have an affordability problem but the LCBS says that 
small numbers can, although strictly speaking it is not a housing affordability 
problem but a liveability problem, that is, their incomes are too low to cover the 
necessities of life even without a mortgage. 
3. In terms of various compositional effects, the data shows that renters have the 
most severe affordability problem, with aged renters the worst off, 84.3 per cent of 
singles and 62.2 per cent of couples being below the LCBS. 
4. Families are also problematic, particularly if they have younger children. Among 
households with children, 34.3 per cent were below the LCBS, but if the children 
were under five it was 68 per cent. Why this is the case is probably a combination 
of the additional costs of the second children being less (they can use the first 
child’s belongings) and, more importantly, a parent may have to drop out of the 
workforce for some time to undertake child-rearing functions. If they had taken on 
a mortgage on the assumption of two incomes, this could explain what appears to 
be a higher incidence of affordability problems among young families in ownership 
than in rental. 
5. Hitherto in Australia there has been little attempt to break down the income 
composition of households below the 40 per cent decile. In this study we do this, 
and not surprisingly find that the affordability problem is most intense in the bottom 
two income deciles when using the LCBS, indeed, they account for 75 per cent of 
all households with an affordability problem. But, suggesting the housing 
affordability problem is as much an income support problem as a housing cost 
one, 73 per cent of households below the LCBS (mostly in these two bottom 
deciles) had government pensions or benefits as their main source of income. 
6. If we use the MCBS we find some 30.7 per cent of households are below that 
standard. These are very high proportions, with the implications here not being 
just about housing but a broader one about the economy: a very large proportion 
of Australian households after meeting housing costs have little capacity to save 
or to purchase goods and services beyond what is needed for a modest lifestyle. 
Mortgage default data indicates that such housing stress levels are not resulting in 
people falling out of housing, as in the USA, but it is likely that other consumption 
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is being sacrificed. Perhaps it is little wonder that the retail, hospitality and 
domestic tourism sectors in Australia have been flattish for some time, given the 
degree to which housing costs crowd out other expenditures. And, of course, as 
the affordability problem deepens there will be even less capacity to consume 
other items. The crowding-out effect of housing costs on other expenditures is an 
obvious point but one that has not been made strongly enough in Australia: high 
housing costs may have major impacts on economic growth. 
7. A comparison of the scale and form of residual income affordability between 
Victoria and Massachusetts (very comparable states in similar market liberal 
societies) found that affordability was much worse in Massachusetts, but again 
this has more to do with income support than housing costs (see Section 4). This 
emphasises another point that is often neglected, that is, affordability solutions are 
not always about housing. The form and structure of income support (as 
discussed in Section 4) is fundamental to understanding issues around housing 
affordability. This section also highlighted the limitations of raw measurement tools 
such as those of Demographia (2010) in international comparisons of affordability. 
This would have Melbourne relative to Boston as an affordability basket case but, 
using the more nuanced residual income method, this is not so: taking into 
account household composition and residual incomes in relation to house prices 
and rents, Boston is much worse. 
8. Section 5 outlined a residual income model building exercise where for any 
household type and income the relevant deductions (taxation) or additions (family 
allowance, benefits) could be made. This then creates a residual income that 
enables, as illustrated in Figure 1 (a case study of a couple with two children), a 
working out of how much is left over to afford ownership or rental. The modelling 
shows that (a) there are very great differences in ability to purchase or rent 
between household types, with families the most problematic, and (b) above a 
certain income point there is much greater capacity to purchase or rent than the 
much used 30 per cent rule would tell us. This, as Section 5 discusses, gives us a 
better understanding of housing dynamics, including why people can still purchase 
in the face of what seem insurmountable prices and rents and why the building 
industry is building what it does and where (one and two-bedroom apartments in 
the inner city, detached houses on the fringe). 
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Figure 1: Maximum affordable mortgage repayments using two types of budget 
standard and two measures of housing affordability, couple with two children, 2010 
 
9. Section 5.3.3 applied the modelled household residual incomes to the Melbourne 
and Adelaide residential property markets in 2010 to assess to what degree there 
were affordability constraints across housing submarkets for different household 
types contemplating first-time home purchase. For both markets, it found that 
families with incomes less than $40 000 were out of the market, and between 
$40 000 and $80 000 their only option was outer suburbs and, in Melbourne, 
growth areas. Not until household income exceeded $100 000 was there much 
ability for families to purchase in the inner city and middle ring. The short message 
here is that having children and home purchase are potentially important trade-
offs for many first-time buyer households. On the other hand, singles and couples 
on incomes above $60 000 had much wider housing choice and could effectively 
consider inner urban purchase, particularly in Melbourne where, unlike families, 
they could choose one and two-bedroom apartments. 
10. Section 6.2 illustrated the use of the residual income method for developing price 
points for what represents affordable housing for different household types. These 
could be used in inclusionary zoning or planning negotiations with industry around 
affordable housing provision. The price points when linked to data on the income 
distribution of renters also suggest the usefulness of the method in getting some 
assessment of how many such households can afford to become home 
purchasers. The answer is: increasingly few. 
11. As discussed in Sections 5.3.3 and 8, these household affordability differentials 
appear to be shaping a new urban and social form, with families and detached 
housing on the fringe and non-family households in inner city and middle ring 
locations clustered in growing numbers of one and two-bedroom apartments. As 
discussed, there may be long-term problems in such an urban form. 
12. Section 7 looked at the implications of the residual income model for social 
housing, including capacity to be an alternative basis for setting rents. The 
conclusion was that it does not have this capacity. If rents were set at the budget 
standard for public housing, they would have to be at levels that would greatly 
compound financial viability problems for housing agencies. Into the bargain, a 
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residual income rent remains a household rent, with all the administrative costs 
and work disincentive implications of such a rent. 
13. The residual income method does show that many public tenants are in hardship 
after paying a so-called affordable rent, the 25 per cent household rent, which is 
not surprising as there has never been any rationale for it as an affordable rent. If 
rents were set to an affordable level, it would mean near zero rents for some 
household types and incomes but increases for others. Thus, under the current 
rent structure, those on very low incomes may be paying an excessive amount of 
income on rents and not leaving enough for other expenditure, while those on 
higher incomes in most cases have more than enough to live on after paying the 
25 per cent household rent (see Tables 18, 19, 20 and 21). However, if rents were 
restructured to reflect these inequities, the net effect would likely be a major 
reduction in rental income for housing agencies in a context where they are 
already financially problematic. In short, this exploration of the implications of the 
residual income model only adds to the evidence that the current mix of a flat 25 
per cent household rent and a market rent is highly difficult for tenants and 
housing organisations. Funding and rent-setting reform is necessary, but the latter 
requires dealing with the former first. 
14. The residual income model was used to test income eligibility for the National 
Rental Affordability Scheme (NRAS) and the discounted market rent for targeting. 
How well does the scheme meet the affordability capacity for the various 
household types? The answer (reflected in Table 22) was ‘very well’, with the 
general conclusion being: ‘If only public housing, and perhaps by default 
community housing, rent could be as well targeted to what households can 
actually afford!’ 
The analysis did prompt consideration of whether similar levels of funding could be 
used for a home ownership program, as discussed in Section 8. 
Conclusion 
While exploratory, the findings in this report suggest the usefulness of the residual 
income method as a basis for more informed decision-making around affordability 
issues and for more detailed analysis of the implications. As one of the model’s 
limitations is the complexity in creating it, this Final Report is accompanied by a 
template of the model to enable any agency or individual to undertake residual income 
analysis based on whatever assumptions of gross income, interest rates, deposits, 




While researching this report, one of the authors had to visit a dentist. The dentist 
started talking (why they do so when patients cannot answer back is a puzzle) and 
commented on how he found the high house prices in Melbourne completely 
inexplicable and was worried about his children’s housing futures. Now, if a dentist on 
his high salary is expressing puzzlement over high house prices, it is understandable 
why large proportions of ordinary Australians do likewise. The next day one of us was 
attending the launch of the first evaluation report of a homelessness pilot program, 
and the speeches had many in the audience reflecting on how has this all occurred. 
Why, at the most affluent point in our history, do we have more homelessness, more 
people in marginal housing forms (e.g. boarding houses, caravans) and longer waiting 
lists for social housing than at any other time in our recent history? Obviously part of 
the answer is about politics and policy and, to be blunt, a political unwillingness to 
tackle these problems. But in part, and where this study comes in, it is also about the 
fact that, despite considerable research, there are still gaps in our knowledge of the 
scale and form of our housing problems and the relationship to housing markets and 
policy. 
Housing affordability and housing market dynamics (in the case of this project, the 
latter a shorthand for the drivers of and the decision-making processes in housing 
markets) have moved to the front of the housing policy agenda in recent years. While 
the two topics are related, different processes have given them greater prominence. 
The former (housing affordability), of course, has been around for decades (Priorities 
Review Staff 1975; Committee of Inquiry into Housing Costs 1978; National Housing 
Strategy 1991; Productivity Commission 2004) and takes on renewed vigour every 
time there is an escalation in interest rates, house prices or rents, although the first 
two get much more attention, particularly from the media, than the third (rents). And 
the lack of policy reform varies inversely with the number of reports and studies: the 
more there appear to be, the less that happens. 
Economists have long given attention to housing markets but rarely has this analysis 
had such prominence in research and policy environments. One reason is recognition 
that markets can fail, for example the collapse of the Irish, Spanish and US housing 
markets, with major implications for economies and society. But another is that, in 
Australia, we still do not know enough about what drives house prices and rents, 
about the decision-making of market actors (consumers, builders, investors) and how 
they might respond to changing policy environments. In a context where the external 
environment for housing users and producers is becoming more complex as a result 
of demographic growth, sustainability needs, government fiscal constraints and rising 
consumer expectations, this lack of understanding of market dynamics is troubling. 
This report is a contribution by intent to the affordability literature and by default to the 
housing market dynamics literature. In other words, in seeking to provide a better 
measure and explanation of the housing affordability problem in Australia we provided 
findings which give us a different and perhaps better understanding of how Australian 
housing markets work. 
This is the Final Report from a large study on using the residual income approach to 
measure housing affordability. For those unfamiliar with the concept, this is an 
alternative to the benchmark method of affordability measurement and calculates how 
much is left over for rents or mortgages after relevant expenditure items for different 
household types have been taken into account. If there is insufficient left for rents and 




The study does not aim to replicate the substantial housing affordability research 
already undertaken by AHURI in the National Research Venture 3 (NRV3) but to build 
on that research (Yates & Milligan 2007). It is therefore much more limited in focus, 
and complements the NRV by updating and expanding information on the scale and 
form of affordability using a residual income approach and by taking affordability 
research in some new directions (i.e. as a tool to understand housing market 
dynamics). A substantial Positioning Paper (Stone et al. 2011) already written on the 
topic did two things. 
Using existing literature, Part A provided an overview of the various semantic, 
substantive and definitional issues around the notion of affordability, leading to an 
argument in support of the soundness of the residual income approach. This overview 
is set in the historical contexts of discussions about affordability measures in the 
Australia, the UK and the USA. 
Part B was methodological; it showed for selected household types and income 
ranges, both for home purchase and rental, how the residual income method can be 
operationalised. The latter also provided details on the methodology and, although 
there has been some fine-tuning for this Final Report (discussed where relevant in the 
text), there is no need to repeat the methodological details here. However, a summary 
of the method is provided in Section 3. 
This Final Report is not meant to be an exhaustive treatment of the residual income 
method but is designed to illustrate its potential, relative to benchmark methods, for 
understanding a number of housing affordability related issues. And while the subject 
matter could potentially be quite technical and detailed, the report aims to minimise 




2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
Building on the Positioning Paper, this Final Report has a number of objectives. These 
are to: 
1. Use the residual income method to calculate the distribution of housing 
affordability in Australia in aggregate and for individual household types by tenure, 
income, state and other relevant variables in order to get some assessment of the 
scale and distribution of residual income affordability. This includes comparison 
with the 30/40 measure of affordability to evaluate the difference. 
2. Compare these aggregate Australian findings with those for the USA, as 
representing a form of benchmark to assess how badly or well Australia performs 
in terms of affordability. 
3. Model the affordability capacity of case study households (single person, couple 
with two children) across a broad income range to provide a better understanding 
of how affordability constraints, as indicated by the residual income method, are 
potentially shaping the operation of housing markets. 
4. Illustrate, using the Melbourne and Adelaide home purchase markets, what the 
residual income method suggests about the performance of these housing 
markets in terms of affordability. 
5. Illustrate, using the Melbourne rental market, what the residual income method 
suggests about the performance of this housing market and associated 
submarkets in terms of affordability. 
6. Test the appropriateness of the residual income method for social and affordable 
housing rent-setting policy and eligibility practices. 
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3 WHAT IS THE RESIDUAL INCOME METHOD? 
Australia has almost become immune to stories about the scale of the housing 
affordability problem. A considerable amount of research shows that mortgage stress 
for lower income households has increased over the last decade and that the absolute 
numbers and percentages involved are high. Using the 30/40 rule, Yates and Gabriel 
(2006) found 49 per cent of purchasers were in housing stress, while the National 
Centre for Social and Economic Modelling (NATSEM) suggests around 35 per cent on 
the same criteria (Tanton et al. 2008). Among renters, the figures are even more 
startling with Yates and Gabriel (2006) finding that 65 per cent of all renter households 
were in housing stress and in fact accounted for 51 per cent of all low to moderate 
income households with an affordability problem. 
These studies used a benchmark method of measuring housing affordability to 
produce these results. This method typically takes 30 per cent of gross and sometime 
disposable income committed to mortgage or rental payment as the benchmark and 
applies this either to all households or to the lower 40 per cent. However, it takes no 
account of the different taxation and expenditure requirements of different household 
types and thus may overstate or understate the actual amount a household type has 
available to afford housing. As discussed in the Positioning Paper, it has also been 
criticised because there is no clear rationale that underpins the chosen benchmark 
and for its inability to indicate price points to guide industry or government as to what 
represents affordable housing. 
The major alternative method for measuring affordability is the residual income 
method which, as the name implies, calculates for different households how much is 
left over for housing after relevant expenditure as measured by some budget standard 
is taken into account. Table 1 below compares the ratio and residual method at their 
most simplistic. Both Household A and Household B have incomes of $40 000. If a 
ratio of 30 per cent is used, Household A has $12 000 to spend on housing, but if a 
residual method is used and the budget standard for that household type (Household 
B) is $30 000 they only have $10 000 available. In the latter case, if there is 
insufficient left for housing after meeting this standard, then the household has an 
affordability problem. The challenge in creating such a measure is: what is an 
appropriate budget standard? 
Table 1: Simplified comparison of ratio and residual affordability measures 
Household Affordability measure How much can be spent on 
housing? 
Household A: gross income 
$40,000 per annum 
Ratio method: 30% of income  $12,000 (30% of $40,000) 
Household B: gross income 
$40,000 per annum  
Residual method: How much 
is available if budget standard 
is, say, $30,000? 
$10,000 ($40,000 less 
$30,000) 
The basis for formulating such a measure for Australia was provided with the 
development of indicative budget standards by the Budget Standards Unit of the 
SPRC at the University of New South Wales (Saunders et al. 1998). Drawing 
theoretically and methodologically upon the extensive history of such work in the UK 
and USA, but pushing beyond it, they formulated normative budgets as the sum of 
cost standards (as of February 1997) for nine separate categories of consumption. 
Two budget standards were established: ‘modest but adequate’ and ‘low cost’. The 
‘modest but adequate’ standard was similar to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) ‘intermediate’ budget, which had earlier been called ‘modest but adequate’. The 
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‘low cost’ standard was similar to the BLS ‘lower’ budget and the UK Family Budget 
Unit ‘low cost but acceptable’ budgets that have been used to operationalise residual 
income affordability standards for the UK and USA (see Positioning Paper). 
Throughout this report we refer to the two budget standards as the MCBS and the 
LCBS. 
One of the notable advances of the Australian indicative budgets over the work in the 
UK and USA is that the MCBS was computed for 26 household types and the LCBS 
for 20 household types, differing by size, composition and tenure. This level of detail 
obviated the need for contentious equivalence scales1 that plagued the UK and US 
standards and the Henderson poverty standard in Australia. The Australian budget 
standards are, however, only for areas where costs for household expenditures are 
normal. They do not factor in the different expenditures in remote and regional areas 
where transport and other costs related to distance are much higher than in 
metropolitan areas or nearby regional areas. 
This data base provides the foundations for measuring the scale and form of a 
residual income affordability problem in Australia by stripping out the housing 
expenditures estimated in the budget standard, such as mortgages and rents, thus 
making it possible to calculate the residual left for housing. This is not the first time 
that this has been done In Australia. Seelig (1999) and Burke and Ralston (2003) did 
some exploratory work using census data and Yates and Gabriel (2006) applied it to 
the 2002–03 ABS Income and Housing survey. This study also uses the ABS Income 
and Housing survey data but updates it to 2006–07, with the caution that both the 
method used and the data attributes were slightly different to those of Yates and 
Gabriel’s analysis and therefore direct comparison with that study cannot be made. 
The major difference is that fewer households were included in the current analysis. 
This study only looks at the main household types of singles, couples, couples with 
one, two or three children, and sole parents with one or two children, partly on the 
grounds that other household arrangements have more complicated financial and 
housing cost relationships creating more difficulties of analysis, but also because a 
template is to be created by which residual income data can be updated by any 
agency interested in doing so, and the more household types, the more work is 
involved in undertaking such a process. But even within these household types there 
were exclusions. Households with children were excluded if they had a non-
dependent offspring as their income is typically not included in the acquisition of a 
mortgage (and may or may not contribute to rental costs), and therefore to include 
their income would understate the affordability problem. For the same reason, 
households with more than one income unit or multi-income units were also excluded, 
other than those which were an income of the reference person or their 
spouse/partner. Also excluded were those households renting privately from a parent 
or other relative. 
Other household arrangements were excluded because the data would not be 
meaningful or relevant, for example those who had disposable incomes of less than 
zero or if their disposable income minus housing costs left zero income. Households 
who had mortgages, but other descriptors indicated the borrowing was not for the 
house being lived in but a second house (e.g. rental unit or holiday home), were also 
                                               
1
 When there is no expenditure data to use to calculate the different expenditure needs for different 
household types, each household type in the population is assigned a value in proportion to its needs, 
that is, an equivalence scale. For example, a childless couple might be deemed to have 0.8 needs of a 
couple with one child. The factors commonly taken into account to assign these values are the size of the 
household and the age of its members (whether they are adults or children). The problem is that there is 
no internationally accepted set of equivalence scales. 
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excluded. After these deletions, 72 per cent of all households were still included in the 
analysis for both years. 
Some may question why the data was not pushed back further, for example to the 
1997–98 Income and Housing survey, to allow for some historical analysis. The 
reason is that the survey record files in that year are set up as ‘income units’ within a 
household rather than as an actual household as is the case for 2003–04 and 2007–
08. Furthermore, the 1997 survey did not have disposable income as a variable. Thus 
the data for the 1990s is non-comparable to that for 2003–04 and 2007–08. 
The other methodological challenge in updating the SPRC budget standards was 
what index to use in order to bring them up to the relevant year. In the Positioning 
Paper, the ABS consumer price index was used, but this Final Report uses a 
composite index made up of 50 per cent of the CPI all groups minus housing and 50 
per cent of the per capita household disposable income index, the latter being the 
same index as used by the Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social 
Research (MIAESR) (2011) for the construction of its poverty line. The former can be 
seen as a measure of the cost of the basket of goods that makes up the expenditure 
standard, and the latter as a measure of changing aspirations and as recognition that 
there are new items of necessary expenditure now that were not recognised in 1998, 
for example mobile phones and broadband web connection. A composite was seen to 
be appropriate as the household disposable index used by the MIAESR would 
exaggerate the rate of increase as it is solely an income measure and has no 
relationship with expenditure, while the CPI would be too low as it is only about a fixed 
bundle of expenditure and does not allow for changes in consumption and the 
emergence of new expenditure items as incomes rise. Setting an appropriate index 
will always be a vexed problem in the absence of updated budget standards (see 
Appendix 2 for more details on indexing). 
To exemplify the broad level of expenditures determined by indexing of the budget 
standard, Table 2 shows the 2010 LCBS and MCBS excluding housing for owner 
occupiers and renters for each of the household types. For example, a young single 
person living to a LCBS could get by on spending $275 per week while, say, a couple 
with three children would require $747. If they were to live to the MCBS, expenditures 
would be a lot more. 






Single Under 65 $275 $392 
65 and over $272 $377 
Couple Under 65 $416 $603 
65 and over $400 $548 
Couple with 
children 
1 $555 $805 
2 $655 $975 
3 $747 $1,233 
Sole parent 1 $348 $565 
2 $467 $771 
Source: Original budget standard data; Saunders et al. (1998); indexed by composite of ABS CPI and per 
capita household disposable income. 
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These budget standards when applied to measures of income and housing costs 
provide the potential for determining the scale of affordability problems and the 
capacity for households to participate in the market, whether for rental or purchase. 
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4 THE POLICY ENVIRONMENT 
The large AHURI affordability study (NRV3) concluded that there were major 
weaknesses and limitations in current approaches to assisting households to access 
and maintain affordable housing (Yates & Milligan 2007, p.38). While there have been 
some policy changes since then, they have not been substantive enough or sustained 
enough to make any real impact on the affordability problem, and in fact the situation 
has been worsened by continuing escalation of rents and house prices above the rate 
of growth of household incomes. Yates and Milligan’s conclusion thus still stands. 
Table 3 below lists the major forms of housing and housing-related policy that affect 
housing affordability in Australia and summarises their policy intent, the degree to 
which they have any performance measurement attached, and their strengths and 
weaknesses in terms of dealing with affordability issues. The distinction between 
housing and housing-related policy is an important one as Australia has few housing 
explicit policies (i.e. designed for designated housing outcomes). Much policy is 
designed for other outcomes and the effects on the housing market and submarkets in 
most cases are accidental or collateral. Nevertheless they are still as important as, if 
not more important than, explicit housing policy. 
In terms of this research, which is concerned with affordability as a complex 
relationship between incomes, expenditures and housing costs, the crucial policies 
are those related to incomes and housing costs. Often housing affordability studies 
tend to focus just on housing costs but income support policies are also crucial; house 
prices and rents may be low by international standards but if incomes are even lower 
then there is an affordability problem. 
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Part of the problem for Australian housing affordability is that income and support 
payments (i.e. pensions and benefits) are simply too low for households in receipt of 
them to afford the level of private housing market rents and prices, and the same 
could be said of the household rents charged in social housing. Income support 
payments are welfare payments made by the Commonwealth Government whose 
principles were broadly set decades ago (beginning in 1909 for the first age pension) 
to meet (very) basic consumption needs, with the view being that recipients are 
dependent on those payments as their primary source of income (Mendelsohn 1979). 
What represented basic consumption needs at the time and the various payment 
structures that were evolved to address them were different to the present, and the 
system has away been handicapped by two features: first, the assumption that 
payments were made out of general tax revenue (i.e. it was not a contributory system 
as exists in virtually all other developed societies) (Hill 2006, p.47); and second, that 
recipients of benefits (originally just aged persons) would be outright home owners 
(Kemeny 1981). The former assumption was premised on a belief that entitlement to 
social security was rights based and related to need, rather than something to be 
‘bought’ by paying a financial contribution (Kewley 1969). Given the funding of 
payments out of tax, this has meant that any attempt to substantially boost income 
support payments founders on the problem that this would require an increase in tax 
levels to fund it. And with Australia being a conservative market liberal nation broadly 
resistant to taxation, despite being one of the least taxed countries in the OECD 
(OECD 2010, Table A), the constraints on any government wishing to increase 
income support levels are substantial. Historically this has meant that there has been 
no universal attempt to boost payments overall, but rather reform has come 
incrementally by extending eligibility to new groups (but not increasing levels of 
funding) or by creating a highly targeted add-on payment, such as the supplementary 
payment for age pensioners which morphed into CRA (Herscovitch & Stanton 2008). 
The second assumption, home ownership, has always meant a low level of payment 
compared to equivalent societies. The standard measure of such payments is the net 
replacement rate, that is, the degree to which a pension or unemployment benefit 
replaces employed earnings. Using this measure, OECD data reveals that Australia is 
one of the bottom countries (out of 28) in terms of the level of such payments (Ortiz 
2009; OECD 2011). While a general problem for all recipient households, the low level 
of payments is a major problem for renters that is only partly addressed by CRA. And 
while pensions and benefits are premised on outright ownership, we have to 
remember that many of these income support payments are based many decades in 
the past and have been indexed from such times, and by 2011 there is no guarantee 
even for outright owners that they will automatically cover all expenditures required to 
keep to a minimum and certainly a budget standard. 
Turning now to housing rather than income, it is notable that the two housing-specific 
policies that offer definite housing affordability outcomes are the National Affordable 
Housing Agreement (NAHA) (formerly the Commonwealth-State Housing Agreement 
(CSHA)) and the NRAS. However, in terms of delivering affordability outcomes, they 
are both compromised. In the case of NAHA/CSHA, the capacity to address 
affordability problems for low income earners has been weakened by a funding 
environment which is financially unsustainable both for housing agencies (Hall & Berry 
2007) and for many clients, the latter because of the adoption of a household rent 
(typically around 25% of income) that has more to do with revenue generation than 
actually providing a rent that leaves sufficient to live on (i.e. meeting a budget 
standard) (Burke & Ralston 2003; McNelis 2006). Compounding these problems is a 
decade and a half of targeting to those with the highest needs (worsening the cost 
structures of social housing) and creating an affordability gap in eligibility for low wage 
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households (the working poor) or those without complex needs as very few of these 
two groups can now access, or be eligible for, social housing. 
NRAS was a welcome supply-side initiative of the 2007–10 Labor government 
designed to provide assistance and funding to increase the supply of affordable rental 
dwellings for lower to mid-income earners. It does so by providing an incentive of up 
to $9140 per annum ($6855 from federal and $2285 from state governments, 
increasing annually by the CPI) for investors willing to provide housing that meets 
designated standards and with rents charged out at no more than 80 per cent of 
market rents. There are to be 50 000 NRAS properties funded. While this will make a 
useful addition to the stock of housing that is more affordable than full market housing, 
the rents charged do not necessarily mean affordability as defined by the budget 
standard method. However, this does depend on the household type and where a 
household falls in relation to income limits which are much higher than for social 
housing. The real advantage of supply-based schemes, such as NRAS, is that, by 
increasing the stock of lower end rental housing, they potentially mitigate rental 
pressures, although 50 000 is not a substantial amount, given the deficiency of low 
cost private rental stock (Wulff et al. 2011). 
CRA, often seen as a housing payment, is in fact an income support payment, starting 
out as indicated above as a supplementary payment for age pensioners who were 
private renters. Eligibility has widened over the years but the program is weakened by 
the levels of payment not being linked to any affordability target. The objective is to 
reduce the effect of high rents, and it does put many households into a more 
affordable situation (Melhuish et al. 2004) although again not for the working poor, 
given that eligibility only extends to those in receipt of income support. Rates of 
increase are not linked to increases in rents, thus, as rents rise faster than incomes, 
the ability to provide any semblance of affordability is further weakened and there is 
no difference in payment rates between different housing markets despite major 
variations in rents. Like other countries that have a rental allowance system imbedded 
in an income support system with no explicit housing objectives, there is no evidence 
that allowances, for example CRA, have stimulated an increase in the supply of rental 
housing that is affordable for households in receipt of them (Hulse 2002). Instead, 
there is a decreasing supply of affordable housing (Wulff et al. 2001, 2011). It also has 
no quality requirements, and this arguably has been a contributing factor to the recent 
growth of illegal boarding houses in capital cities where landlords extract excessive 
rents, which include capturing CRA for a minimal standard of dwelling (normally one 
run-down room), from individuals unable to access other affordable rental 
accommodation. 
Of the other policies, FHOG, taxation and planning appear to be as much part of the 
affordability problem as a solution in that they all have the potential to increase 
dwelling prices or rents rather than stabilise them. Thus, with minor exceptions in New 
South Wales and South Australia, current approaches to planning and managing 
residential development and redevelopment are not directed to assisting affordable 
housing provision (Gurran et al. 2008) while tax policies appear to be encouraging 
demand by investors but with much of that investment going into existing stock rather 
than new supply, with the gap in new investment most visible at the lower end of the 
market (Wulff et al. 2011). FHOG also appears to be an important driver of demand 
rather than of supply outcomes (Wood et al. 2003; Newman 2002). 
In short, the current policy environment in relation to lower income renters, aspirant 
purchasers and struggling first-time buyers is unlikely to provide many with a solution 
to their affordability problem. In principle, one might think therefore that the scale of 
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the problem could create a ‘policy window’ where reform of the current policy 
environment might occur. 
However, one suspects that the collapse of home purchase and associated house 
price falls in other home ownership societies, such as Ireland, Spain, UK and the 
USA, following the global financial crisis has removed any desire to touch policy that 
might destabilise or help dwelling prices and rents fall in the interests of greater 
affordability. For Treasury and Finance departments concerned primarily with 
economic stability and productivity, affordability is not a problem unless it links through 
to these two objectives. Thus, while we may document in this study that some 14 per 
cent of Australian households are under major financial and wellbeing pressures, this 
is seen by central agencies as a personal trouble for such households, not a problem 
that affects the stability or productivity of the economy. If this affordability problem was 
to threaten mortgage default and cause an economic downturn the position would 
change but, as data provided by Berry et al. (2010) and Hulse et al. (2010) 
demonstrates, at the time this data was collected (2007–08) this was not the case in 
the Australian context. Moreover, given that housing wealth is a driver of consumption 
(Yates & Whelan 2009), central agencies would be reluctant to risk a contraction in 
consumer spending by policies which would undermine that wealth by reducing 
dwelling prices. Similarly at the state level, stamp duty is a major source of revenue 
and thus any slowdown in property turnover or contraction in prices will affect the 
bottom line of state finances. In this policy environment it is easy to see why dramatic 
reform by way of improving affordability is not, and in some respects cannot be, a 
major government objective. Reform must be incremental and managed in such a way 
as not to threaten market stability. The question in this study is what research findings 
might it yield which could contribute to incremental reform. 
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5 RESEARCH FINDINGS 
5.1 Measuring the scale of the affordability problem 
The first research task for the residual income method using the 2007–08 ABS 
Income and Housing Survey was to compare the aggregate findings with the 30 per 
cent benchmark method (both gross and disposable). Table 4 below reveals that there 
are differences, but not consistent differences. For the key measure in Australia, that 
is, for the lowest 40 per cent of income earners, and using the LCBS the latter is 
higher (33.6%) than the 30/40 disposable income method for all households (23.9%) 
but lower for private renters (47.7% vs 61.7%). If the MCBS is used, this method is 
higher for all households other than private renters where it is almost the same as the 
30/40 (32.8% vs 27.0%). If a gross 30/40 rule is used, the overall (all households and 
tenures) percentage is slightly higher again than the LCBS (15.8 vs 14.1%). Given 
these differences, we might conclude that for an overall measure of affordability (i.e. 
all households and tenures), the 30 per cent rule is fine as it is not that different to the 
LCBS budget standard. However, for compositional analysis by tenure and income 
type, the residual method is likely to be more accurate. 
One reason why the 30/40 disposable income rule is lower than the LCBS for those 
households in the lowest 40 per cent of income earners (33.6% vs 23.9.0%) is that 
under 30/40 principles no social housing tenants have an affordability problem (it is 
defined away) where the LCBS identifies that most do so. The second is that outright 
owners, again by definition in the 30/40 rule, cannot have an affordability problem but 
the LCBS says small numbers have a financial problem, although it is not a housing 
affordability problem but a liveability problem, that is, their incomes are too low to 
cover the necessities of life even without a mortgage. 







Paying more than 
30% of disposable 
income on housing 
Paying more than 
30% of gross 
income on housing 
All households 14.1% 30.7% 21.0% 15.8% 
Lowest 40% (of 
equivalised disposable 
income) 
33.6% 69.6% 23.9% 23.3% 
All households, private 
renters 
17.0% 32.8% 31.9% 27.0% 
All households, private 
renters lowest 40% 
47.7% 85.2% 61.7% 60.2% 
Source: ABS Income and Housing Survey 2007–08 unit record files. 
Turning to the tenure-specific data, Table 4 (all households) and Table 5 (lowest 40%) 
show not surprisingly, and consistent with other findings, that renters have the most 
severe affordability problem although in absolute numbers they are just slightly beaten 
by owners. On the LCBS measure for the lowest 40 per cent of household incomes, 
55 per cent of renters in 2007–08 had an affordability problem compared to 22 per 
cent of owners. For the MCBS, it was 88 per cent and 60 per cent respectively. These 
are very high proportions, with the implication here not just about housing but a 
broader one about the economy: a very large proportion of Australian households 
after meeting housing costs have little capacity to save or purchase goods and 
services beyond what is needed for a modest lifestyle. As noted earlier, mortgage 
 
 20 
default data (Berry et al. 2009) indicates that such housing stress levels are not 
resulting in people falling out of housing as in the USA, but it is likely that other 
consumption is being sacrificed.2 This raises the possibility that housing outlays, 
whether mortgages or rents, are another factor in explaining subdued consumption 
expenditure in other sectors. Do housing costs crowd out other expenditures? And, of 
course, as the affordability problem deepens, there will be even less capacity to 
consume other items. 
While there is some evidence that housing wealth can increase consumption (Yates & 
Whelan 2009), the counter-argument could be put that some of the effect is negated 
by the costs associated with generating that wealth, that is, the foregone consumption 
required of large mortgages and rents. There is not the evidence here to rigorously 
support the argument but it is worthy of more attention, given the scale of the 
affordability problem and that all consumption requires trade-offs between different 
goods and services. Perhaps suggestive of the need for further work here is Figure 2 
below. This figure shows the long-term trend in retail spending and highlights that the 
current flatness is not a phenomenon of the last few years, as much industry and 
media commentary would suggest, but is part of a sustained flatness relative to the 
high rates of spending of the 1980s. This is despite the latter not having the same 
availability of easy finance as more recent years. However, what the era of more 
subdued retail spending coincides with is the major decline in housing affordability 
since the 1990s. It is a relationship needing more research. 
Figure 2: Retail turnover: percentage change on previous financial year, 1984–2011 
 
Source. ABS Retail Turnover by Industry Group, Tables 8501.0, Retail Trade, Australia 
                                               
2
 It should be noted that the data collection was in 2007–08. Given that rents and particularly house 
prices have increased since then, with many buyers purchasing in 2009 when interest rates were 3 per 
cent, there are now likely to be greater affordability problems and potential for default. No doubt some 
buyers who took on mortgages at 3 per cent had not planned on them (or budgeted for) being 7.5 per 















It is low income public renters who have the most severe affordability problem (69% 
LCBS 2007–08), which contradicts the false assumption that the 25 per cent 
household rent formula shelters such tenants from an affordability problem (see 
Tables 5 and 6). The 30/40 rule by definition means that no public housing tenants 
have an affordability problem but it is tautological, of course, to call such a benchmark 
the affordable rent (as noted earlier, such ratios have no rationale) then set the rent at 
this level and subsequently claim all households who pay such a rent are in a position 
of housing affordability. 
What this public housing affordability data reveals is the severe stress on both tenants 
and housing organisations of operating in a funding context (the NAHA) that can 
provide neither affordability to tenants nor financial sustainability to organisations. 
Rents have to be pushed to these unaffordable levels to create some semblance of 
financial sustainability for housing organisations but, in doing so, enormous pressures 
are placed on the tenants. However, this affordability outcome does not mean that the 
impact bears equally on all tenants, as a flat rent-setting formula does not recognise 
the affordability capacity of different household types. This point is taken up in more 
detail in Section 8. 
Table 5: Number and percentage of households with residual income affordability 
problem, all households 
Tenure 
Below LCBS Below MCBS Total 
households Households % Households % 
Owner without a mortgage 174,210 8.3% 641,141 30.7% 2,087,036 
Owner with other mortgage 28,522 6.7% 66,704 15.7% 424,164 
Owner with a mortgage 212,692 12.2% 404,019 23.2% 1,740,077 
OWNER 415,424 9.8% 1,111,864 26.2% 4,251,277 
Private renter 216,799 17.0% 417,524 32.8% 1,273,462 
Public renter 186,337 65.4% 251,982 88.5% 284,735 
RENTER 403,135 25.9% 669,506 43.0% 1,558,197 
Total 818,559 14.1% 1,781,370 30.7% 5,809,474 
Table 6: Number and percentage of households with residual income affordability 
problem, lowest 40 per cent of equivalised income 
Tenure 
Below LCBS Below MCBS Total 
households Households % Households % 
Owner without a mortgage 174,210 14.7% 641,141 54.2% 1,183,967 
Owner with other mortgage 26,671 25.7% 60,047 57.9% 103,631 
Owner with a mortgage 178,280 56.2% 282,278 88.9% 317,477 
OWNER 379,161 23.6% 983,466 61.3% 1,605,075 
Private renter 214,356 47.7% 382,713 85.2% 448,987 
Public renter 186,337 69.1% 251,982 93.4% 269,727 
RENTER 400,693 55.8% 634,695 88.3% 718,714 
Total 779,853 33.6% 1,618,161 69.6% 2,323,789 
Source: ABS Income and Housing Survey 2007–08 unit record files 
Another cut on the affordability problem is that between first and subsequent home 
purchasers who purchased in the last three years. One could hypothesise that first-
time purchasers would have the greater affordability problems as with no equity they 
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would have to borrow more, as well as in all likelihood being younger and having not 
yet reached their income earning peak. Table 7 below shows the residual income 
affordability outcomes for first and second and subsequent buyers by both the MCBS 
and LCBS, for all households and for the lowest 40 per cent of income earners. 
Table 7: Number and percentage of households with residual income affordability 
problem, lowest 40 per cent of equivalised income by first and subsequent home 
purchaser, 2007–08 
  All households Lowest 40% 












28,524 11.3% 54,392 21.5% 20,594 62.6% 32,211 97.9% 
Change-
over buyer 
44,045 11.6% 86,443 22.9% 37,977 60.8% 59,177 94.8% 
Total  72,569 11.5% 140,834 22.3% 58,571 61.5% 91,388 95.9% 
Source: ABS Income and Housing Survey 2007–08 unit record files 
Perhaps surprisingly, there is remarkable similarity: there is not a lot of evidence that 
first-time purchasers, whether all households or lower income households, have any 
more residual income problems than second and subsequent purchasers. What this 
suggests is that many households (the bulk in the case of lower income households) 
extend their purchasing capacity close to or beyond their residual income when 
buying. As pointed out elsewhere, the implication of this is not one of dropping out of 
ownership (Australian households have a remarkable ability to stay in) but for the 
purchase of other goods and services. However, the real attraction of the budget 
standard measure lies less in the aggregated data than in its ability to provide more 
accurate affordability measures for different household types. As Table 8 (all 
households) and Table 9 (lowest 40%) show, singles under 65 and sole parents with 
two children have the highest rates of an affordability problem. For those below the 40 
per cent quintile, 42 per cent of singles have an LCBS affordability problem, rising to 
62 per cent for those under 65. For sole parents, the figure is 39 per cent, but higher 





Table 8: Number and percentage of households with residual income affordability 
problem, by household type, all households 
Household type 
Below LCBS Below MCBS Total 
Count Row% Count Row% Count 
Single (under 65) 229,442 21.1% 322,245 29.6% 1,087,093 
Single (65 and over) 160,979 24.1% 420,449 62.9% 668,343 
SINGLE 390,421 22.2% 742,694 42.3% 1,755,436 
Sole parent 1 child 48,987 20.9% 106,244 45.3% 234,506 
Sole parent 2 children 41,450 27.9% 83,930 56.4% 148,827 
SOLE PARENT 90,437 23.6% 190,174 49.6% 383,333 
Couple 1 child 49,821 9.2% 107,540 20.0% 538,639 
Couple 2 children 89,498 11.2% 205,690 25.8% 797,247 
Couple 3 children 44,252 14.2% 127,369 40.8% 311,887 
COUPLE WITH 
CHILDREN 
183,570 11.1% 440,599 26.7% 1,647,773 
Couple (under 65) 76,471 5.7% 179,622 13.4% 1,345,151 
Couple (65 and over) 45,656 6.7% 206,506 30.5% 677,781 
COUPLE ONLY 122,128 6.0% 386,128 19.1% 2,022,931 
Total 786,555 13.5% 1,759,595 30.3% 5,809,474 
Source: ABS Income and Housing Survey 2007–08 unit record files 
Table 9: Number and percentage of households with residual income affordability 
problem, by household type, lowest 40 per cent based on equivalised income 
Household type 
Below LCBS Below MCBS Total 
Count Row% Count Row% Count 
Single (under 65) 214,927 62.4% 276,667 80.3% 344,463 
Single (65 and over) 160,979 29.6% 418,625 76.9% 544,505 
SINGLE 375,906 42.3% 695,292 78.2% 888,968 
Sole parent 1 child 47,487 37.6% 95,339 75.5% 126,251 
Sole parent 2 children 40,354 41.9% 77,484 80.5% 96,247 
SOLE PARENT 87,841 39.5% 172,823 77.7% 222,498 
Couple 1 child 47,441 42.2% 85,951 76.4% 112,481 
Couple 2 children 78,104 34.8% 170,390 76.0% 224,341 
Couple 3 children 43,208 34.2% 106,256 84.2% 126,255 
COUPLE WITH 
CHILDREN 
168,752 36.4% 362,597 78.3% 463,077 
Couple (under 65) 71,545 28.2% 160,698 63.4% 253,324 
Couple (65 and over) 45,656 9.2% 205,744 41.5% 495,922 
COUPLE ONLY 117,201 15.6% 366,442 48.9% 749,246 
Total 749,700 32.3% 1,597,155 68.7% 2,323,789 
Source: ABS Income and Housing Survey 2007–08 unit record files 
In recognition of the private rental sector being the problematic one in terms of 
affordability, Table 10 below provides greater detail on this sector and looks at rental 
households in the lowest 40 per cent of income quintiles for each household type. 
Using the LCBS it reveals high proportions of affordability problems across all 
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household types, but with older households the stand-out group. Among aged singles 
in private rental, 84.3 per cent have an LCBS affordability problem, and for couples it 
is 62.2 per cent. In absolute numbers these are not huge, and for couples represent 
less than 10,000 households. This group could be the focus of some form of targeted 
assistance, for example rent assistance plus (see Section 7). Strangely, in private 
rental the scale of the affordability problem decreases with additional children, 
suggesting that the problem related to more children as revealed in Tables 8 and 9 is 
more linked to home purchase. 
Table 10: Number and percentage of lowest 40 per cent households in private rental 
with residual income affordability problem, by household type 
Household type 
Below LCBS Below MCBS Total 
households Households % Households % 
Single (under 65) 67,817 60.9% 89,055 79.9% 111,406 
Single (65 and over) 40,705 84.3% 45,719 94.7% 48,269 
SINGLE 108,522 68.0% 134,774 84.4% 159,675 
Sole parent 1 child 21,137 38.1% 45,783 82.6% 55,458 
Sole parent 2 children 17,523 38.5% 39,772 87.4% 45,513 
SOLE PARENT 38,660 38.3% 85,555 84.7% 100,971 
Couple 1 child 20,062 48.3% 35,473 85.5% 41,507 
Couple 2 children 18,475 27.8% 56,411 84.8% 66,527 
Couple 3 children 9,163 29.6% 27,759 89.7% 30,950 
COUPLE WITH 
CHILDREN 47,699 34.3% 119,643 86.1% 138,984 
Couple (under 65) 9,813 29.0% 28,440 84.1% 33,822 
Couple (65 and over) 9,662 62.2% 14,302 92.1% 15,534 
COUPLE ONLY 19,475 39.5% 42,741 86.6% 49,357 
Total 214,356 47.7% 382,713 85.2% 448,987 
Source: ABS Income and Housing Survey 2007–08 unit record files (NB: incomes are based on 
equivalised income) 
The comments about the poorer affordability position of sole parents with two children 
raise an interesting issue for if we drill down even further into the data and look at 
households with children, we find that having a child under five years of age is a major 
predictor of an affordability problem (Figure 3). Whether for sole parents or couples, if 
the children were under five, the housing affordability problems increase sharply. 
Thus, for sole parents and using the LCBS, 44 per cent with no children under five 
had an affordability problem, but this increased to 68 per cent for those with a child 
under five. The equivalent figures for a couple with children were 22 per cent and 33 
per cent. This is probably due to a combination of the additional costs of the second 
children being less (they can use the first child’s belongings) and, more importantly, a 
parent may have to drop out of the workforce for some time to undertake child-rearing 
functions. If they had taken on a mortgage on the assumption of two incomes, this 
could explain what appears as a higher incidence of affordability problems among 
young families in ownership than in rental. 
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Figure 3: Percentage of households with children with residual income affordability 
problem 
 
Source: ABS Income and Housing Survey 2007–08 unit record files 
Not surprisingly, as Figure 4 below shows, the affordability problem is most intense in 
the bottom two income deciles when using the LCBS, but is spread more broadly if we 
use the MCBS. Most previous studies on affordability In Australia have aggregated all 
households below the 40 per cent rule, but this data draws attention to the need to 
focus on the bottom two income deciles as they account for 75 per cent of the most 
severe affordability cases. This suggests that the housing affordability problem is as 
much an income support problem as a housing cost one as 73 per cent of households 
below the LCBS (mostly in these two bottom deciles) had as their predominant source 
of income government pensions or benefits. The bulk of these were in the private 
rental sector which highlights the point that historically pensions and benefits were 
premised on the assumption of outright ownership. Because of this assumption, 
private renters dependent on pensions and benefits are always going to be in trouble. 
This of course is one of the reasons why lower income singles (many dependent on 
such income support) figure so prominently among the households with the most 
severe affordability problems. 
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Figure 4: Housing affordability, LCBS and MCBS, by income deciles, 2007–08 
 
Source: ABS Income and Housing Survey 2007–08 unit record files 
Figure 5 below summarises the state perspectives in terms of LCBS and MCBS 
affordability in 2007–08. Affordability (i.e. the LCBS) was worst in New South Wales 
and South Australia and best in Western Australia. For the MCBS, South Australia, 
Tasmania and New South Wales were the worst. The high affordability proportions in 
South Australia and to a lesser extent Tasmania, given their lower house prices and 
rentals, reaffirms that much of the affordability problem at the low end is about 
incomes as much as dwelling costs. 
Figure 5: Percentage of households with residual income affordability problem, by 
state, 2007–08 
 
Source: ABS Income and Housing Survey 2007–08 unit record files 
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Whether in aggregate or broken down into its components, Australia has a serious 
affordability problem. However, long and continuing exposure to such problems 
appears to have made Australia somewhat immune to figures of these proportions. 
Perhaps it is the case that while the affordability problem remains a personal trouble 
for the households experiencing it rather than a wider problem for society, there will 
be little policy action. Given that as researchers we are yet to fully demonstrate, most 
notably to central agencies of government, how the affordability issue is a broader 
social and economic problem, there is likely to be continuing lack of policy initiative 
around the issue. 
The key findings for this section are shown in diagrammatic summary in Figure 6 
below. This shows the LCBS outcome applied to the lowest 40 per cent of 
households. Figure 7 shows the outcome for all households (i.e. all incomes), but still 
using the LCBS. 
Figure 6: LCBS for households in lowest 40 per cent of incomes 
 
Figure 7: LCBS for all households 
 
Source: ABS Income and Housing Survey 2007–08 unit record files 
5.2 The Australian and US comparison 
Much of the formative work on the residual income model internationally has been 
done by Michael Stone in the USA (Stone 1993, 2006). It was therefore thought 
opportune to use his knowledge of the method and of US data to provide some 
comparison with that of Australia. 
In various typologies of countries, the USA and Australia tend to be aggregated 
together as market liberal societies with an emphasis upon smaller government, 
individualism and minimum welfare safety nets (Esping-Andersen 1990). How then do 
we compare with another country with broadly similar social and economic attributes 
although still with many differences, for example the larger population and huge 
















































The approach taken here is to control for some of these differences, not by comparing 
the USA with Australia, but by comparing Massachusetts with Victoria. Massachusetts 
has a population of 6.4 million compared to Victoria’s 5.5 million and each state is 
dominated by a major metropolis, Boston (4.4 million) and Melbourne (4.1 million). 
Both are characterised by affluent mixed economies experiencing strong growth 
pressures, although Massachusetts less so since the global financial crisis. 
As mentioned in Section 4, incomes as much as dwelling prices and rents drive the 
affordability equation, so some brief commentary is required on both. One of the major 
differences between the USA and Australia as market liberal societies is Australia’s 
tradition of protecting wage levels as a means of achieving a minimum living standard 
(Castles 1985). This century-old tradition (the first minimum wage was in 1907) stands 
in contrast to many other countries where welfare spending is the path to ensure a 
minimum standard and where there have been no or limited wage standards. The 
USA is one of those countries where income support through the wage system has 
been limited. In Australia the minimum wage in 2010 was just on A$15 per hour, 
compared to A$8 in Massachusetts, which is one of the most generous US states in 
terms of wage support (US Department of Labor 2010, Historical Table). Thus, for 
those in the lowest paid employment, a Victorian worker will have considerably more 
income than their Massachusetts equivalent. 
If out of the workforce, the comparisons are much more complicated as they depend 
on whether we are talking about age pensions, disability pensions or unemployment 
benefits, and, in the case of the age pension, on the degree to which this is 
supplemented by any private superannuation. The situation with the US age pension 
is even more complicated as, unlike Australia’s flat rate, it varies depending upon 
previous workforce income and age at retirement. However, for a single person on a 
low income in the years prior to retirement (e.g. A$40 000), the US weekly pension in 
2010 would have been of the order of A$270 compared to A$330 for an Australian 
Centrelink pension, a slightly meaner level of support. 
Unemployment benefits are also more complicated in the USA, with no national 
unemployment program as it is left up to the individual states. Moreover, again it is not 
a flat rate but related to previous income levels. Massachusetts again is one of the 
more generous states in that claimants receive a weekly benefit of approximately 50 
per cent of their average weekly wage, up to the maximum set by law which in 2010 
was roughly A$600 a week with additional amounts, for example A$25 for each child. 
However, the payment is only for a maximum of 30 weeks, unlike the time-unlimited 
Australian payments (Executive Office of Labor and Workforce Development 2010; 
Centrelink 2010). For somebody previously on a full-time minimum wage of around 
A$320 a week, however, the payment will only be A$160 a week. These compare with 
an Australian single person Newstart allowance of $230 in 2010 (Centrelink 2010). In 
short, for those made unemployed from low income employment, the Massachusetts 
model is harsher than in Australia, particularly when we take into account that it is 
time limited. 
The other side of the affordability equation is rents and dwelling prices. Can US 
incomes buy more because of cheaper rents and dwelling prices or vice versa? Table 
11 below shows the broad attributes of the two states/cities in terms of rental and 
house price values. On the surface there is a certain similarity. In 2006, the year 
before the US housing market collapse, median rents for all property and sale prices 
were almost the same in Boston as in Melbourne. Since then there have been 
divergent paths, with Melbourne’s house prices and rents increasing and Boston’s 
falling for prices and increasing for rents. However, medians always disguise 
distributions, and one of the distinctive features of the US housing market is its much 
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greater spread (in turn reflecting wider income inequalities) and, while data relating to 
this is not available for Boston compared to Melbourne, it is available at a state level. 
Where in Massachusetts 22 per cent of all dwellings sold for less than $200 000 
(2009), in Victoria it was only 8 per cent, although the relative proportions (22% vs 
18%) were closer in 2006 prior to the global financial crisis. One big difference which 
the aggregate data does not show is prices for newly constructed dwellings. It would 
be difficult anywhere in Victoria to find newly constructed property for less than 
$200 000, but in Massachusetts in 2009 24 per cent of all dwellings constructed sold 
for less than this amount (Bluestone et al. 2010, p.36). 
Table 11: House prices and rents, Massachusetts and Victoria, 2006 and 2010 
Year 
All property median rental Median dwelling price 
Percentage of all dwellings 
for sale below $200,000 
Boston Melbourne Boston Melbourne Massachusetts Victoria 
2006 $246 $240 $370,400 $330,000 22% 18% 
2010 $390 $350 $275,000 $460,000 24% (2009) 8% 
Sources: Massachusetts: Center for Urban and Regional Policy (various years) The Greater Boston 
Housing Report Card; Victoria: Office of Housing Rental Report and Valuer General’s Property Sales 
statistics unit record analysis (all prices in Australian dollars at an exchange rate of 1:1) 
With this context, what can we observe from the comparisons? Table 12 below, using 
the same residual income approach to that of Australia,3 shows the number and 
percentage of Massachusetts households (for the same set of households) with an 
affordability problem as compared with Victoria. Both owners and private renters are 
much worse off in Massachusetts. For Massachusetts renters, some 40.2 per cent 
have an affordability problem using the LCBS and 56 per cent if using the MCBS. The 
equivalent figures for Victoria are 24.1 per cent and 42.9 per cent. Given rent levels 
which are not too dissimilar to Victoria’s, the difference is more likely due to the lower 
incomes that many Massachusetts renters are on, which is both a function of the 
labour market and benefits system but also of the higher proportion of sole parent 
households, 20 per cent in Massachusetts compared to 15 per cent in Victoria (Center 
for Urban and Regional Policy 2010, ABS 2007). This is not to say that the rents are 
affordable. Even if incomes at the low end were increased somewhat, the rents in 
both states/cities would be still too high for many lower income earners, illustrating 
that the private market without interventions cannot (and never has been able to) 
provide decent and affordable housing for all citizens. 
Among home owners the differences are much less, with Victorians having a slightly 
lower rate of affordability problems if using the LCBS (9.2% vs 13.9%). If the MCBS is 
used, the situation is reversed, with 23.9 per cent of Massachusetts owners having an 
affordability problem compared to 26.7 per cent in Victoria. The LCBS difference 
appears to be a contradiction in that Victorian house prices are higher than those of 
Massachusetts. However, the data conflates owners and purchasers (the data cannot 
be separated out for Massachusetts) and it is likely that Victoria has a higher rate of 
outright ownership, particularly for lower income earners, given that many entrants 
into the market in the USA in the second half of the 1990s and 2000s were first-time 
buyers (Belsky & Duda 2002; Gramlich 2007). By contrast, in Australia this group 
                                               
3
 The actual budget standards will of course differ because of different judgments as to what represents 
essential expenditure. The US budget standard used to create the Massachusetts residual income is that 
of the Economic Policy Institute (2005) indexed to 2007–08 by the US CPI. In Australia, the SPRC 




contracted over the same period (Hulse et al. 2010; Flood & Baker 2009). Indicative of 
this point is that for Massachusetts in 2006, 47 per cent of all purchasers were first-
time buyers (Bluestone et al. 2008, p.51, Table 4.5), while in Victoria they only 
accounted for 19 per cent (ABS 2010b, Table 10b). And, as the global financial crisis 
brought to light, many of those attracted into purchase in the decade to 2005 had 
incomes too low or mortgages too high to sustain ownership (Gramlich 2007). Many 
have been foreclosed, but many others are still hanging in there representing a 
continued foreclosure threat in the US and Massachusetts markets. 
One can hypothesise that the much higher dwelling prices in Australia created an 
affordability barrier for many households, particularly families (see Section 5.3.2), and 
even if Australian banks had ventured into the sub-prime loan territory there still may 
have not been the take-up. In the US market, even a high cost one by US standards, 
many properties seem so cheap (under $200 000 (in 2010 prices) is not unusual) that 
ownership seemed the logical direction to take for those desiring doing so. By 
contrast, in Victoria, the entry price to first ownership was much higher because of 
higher dwelling prices and interest rates, and for many households it was just a bridge 
too far. This meant the households that did take up borrowing in the 2000s were 
higher income households (Debelle 2008, p.6). This analysis suggests that, 
perversely, Australia’s affordability problem provided a cushion against the financial 
crisis by keeping households that may have been foreclosed out of the market. 
As a general point, the data highlights that the real problem sector in both societies is 
the rental sector, but as both are dominated by the ideology of home ownership they 
seem unable or unwilling to tackle the problems. 
Table 12: Number and percentage of households with residual income affordability 
problem, by household type, Massachusetts and Victoria, 2007–08 
Household type 
Renter Owner 
LCBS MCBS LCBS MCBS 
Mass. Vic. Mass. Vic. Mass. Vic. Mass. Vic. 
Single (under 65) 39.8% 31.3% 52.3% 38.0% 18.3% 11.9% 26.6% 21.7% 
Single (65 and over) 47.9% 65.0% 64.6% 83.7% 29.0% 11.6% 40.6% 53.3% 
SINGLE 42.3% 37.5% 56.1% 46.5% 22.6% 11.7% 32.3% 37.2% 
Sole parent 1 child 42.4% 28.4% 57.1% 52.3% 13.0% 13.8% 23.4% 37.9% 
Sole parent 2 
children 53.4% 16.7% 69.8% 62.6% 14.7% 12.8% 29.0% 26.5% 
SOLE PARENT 46.6% 22.9% 62.0% 57.2% 13.6% 13.4% 25.5% 34.2% 
Couple 1 child 36.3% 15.4% 47.0% 46.9% 9.9% 9.0% 21.0% 17.9% 
Couple 2 children 39.8% 24.4% 52.4% 66.8% 10.9% 10.6% 20.8% 26.3% 
Couple 3 children 48.7% 17.6% 58.5% 74.4% 13.7% 19.3% 32.7% 43.9% 
COUPLE WITH 
CHILDREN 40.5% 18.7% 51.5% 56.5% 12.0% 12.1% 24.2% 27.6% 
Couple (under 65) 17.9% 6.1% 33.0% 11.7% 4.0% 4.2% 6.4% 12.8% 
Couple (65 and 
over) 38.4% 40.8% 52.4% 72.9% 12.0% 5.2% 20.8% 26.2% 
COUPLE ONLY 24.6% 9.0% 39.4% 16.9% 9.1% 4.6% 15.6% 18.2% 
Total 40.2% 24.1% 54.3% 42.9% 13.9% 9.2% 23.9% 26.7% 
Sources: Massachusetts: American Housing Survey 2007 (US Bureau of the Census 2008); Victoria: 
ABS Income and Housing Survey 2007–08 unit record files 
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Looking at the comparisons in terms of household composition, there are some 
important differences. Give that renters are the problem tenure, the analysis 
concentrated on them. In Massachusetts, it is sole parents who have the highest 
degree of rental affordability hardship, but in the USA they do so to a not much 
greater degree than couples with children, illustrating that the additional expenditures 
required of children greatly impact on the ability to achieve affordability. And, as with 
Australia, the problem worsens with each additional child. By contrast, in Australia it is 
singles who have the greatest affordability problem, although predominantly those 
over 65. There are probably two explanations for the much greater housing hardship 
for Massachusetts family renters than Victorians. The first is that larger properties 
(three and four-bedrooms) in Massachusetts are much more expensive than 
equivalent properties in Australia, and second, support for children in Australia 
through family allowance payments (A and B) is much more generous than the US 
equivalents. For example, where the family allowance payment (Tax Benefit A) can go 
up to A$100 per week per child depending on age, for Massachusetts the equivalent 
is only A$25 per child. There is indirect family support in the USA delivered via tax 
breaks and credits but these are strongly linked to employment, which means that 
without an employed income, or just a minimum income, little family support is 
forthcoming (OECD 2011). On the other hand, the greater affordability problems of 
aged persons in Australia (notably those who are 100 per cent pension dependent) 
are likely to reflect the flat pension structure, compared to one in the USA that varies 
in relation to work history and age (more akin to Australian superannuation). 
What this embryonic comparative analysis indicates is that housing affordability issues 
are not just a function of housing programs but of the nature and degree of payment 
of income support. And what it indicates in terms of Australia is that the area for 
income support reform is aged singles, as both by comparison with the USA and by 
comparison with other household types in Australia, this is the stand-out household in 
terms of residual income affordability. A more minor point is that the data illustrates 
the importance of more complex and nuanced analysis in comparative work. The 
much publicised Demographia comparisons of affordability in Australia vis-à-vis other 
English language countries would have Australia as the affordability basket case, but 
the preceding analysis suggests a different story. While affordability may not be good 
in Australia, as represented here by Melbourne, it is much worse in Boston and one 
suspects in other large metropolitan areas of the USA. The difference highlights the 
problem of using very raw one-dimensional measures of affordability, that is ratio 
methods that take no account of the income source and distribution of a society, the 
make-up of that society in terms of household types and the tenure composition; 
Demographia is a home purchase affordability measure and takes no account of 
rental affordability even though in its host country, the USA, many of the largest cities 




6 RESIDUAL INCOME MODELLING: 
AFFORDABILITY AND HOUSING MARKET 
DYNAMICS 
To date, this study has complemented previous affordability research by updating or 
expanding the detail on Australia or by making comparisons with the USA as a form of 
benchmark. In this section the study changes direction and moves us into new 
territory in the application of the residual income method, modelling the affordability 
capacity of different household types in different housing markets. We want to know, 
for example, what a couple with two children on a $60 000 income can afford by way 
of rental or home purchase after deducting the relevant budget standard, or how does 
increasing the income from $40 000 to $60 000 for, say, a single person improve their 
rental or purchasing capacity. This can be achieved by working the residual income 
method into a model that can: 
 Provide for a broad range of incomes and household types a measure of capacity 
to purchase or rent. 
 Indicate what could be price points for affordable housing development for a wide 
range of incomes and household types. 
 Indicate affordability capacity in different housing submarkets. 
This Final Report uses that methodology to exemplify each of these objectives, but 
only for a few household types and two housing markets. However, it is replicable 
more generally, and a by-product will be the provision of a template to model 
outcomes for other household types and markets. In the course of modelling these 
examples we offer some insights into explaining what the benchmark method 
suggests is inexplicable, that is, the sustained increase in house prices despite 
evidence that these prices are not affordable. It also offers a way to understand some 
of the decision-making by residential developers in Melbourne and, given that 
Melbourne is not particularly unique in Australia, in other Australian cities. Before 
doing so, a brief review of the methodology and methodological hurdles is offered. 
There are three major practical issues that have to be dealt with in translating the 
residual income logic into an operational affordability standard. These are, first, how to 
specify the monetary level of a minimum standard of adequacy for non-shelter items 
other than taxes; second, how to scale this standard for various types of households; 
and third, how to deal with personal taxes and other government benefits that 
households on different income levels may receive. 
As previously mentioned, the availability of the two SPRC budget standards has been 
essential for this project, making it possible to devise and apply operational residual 
income affordability scales based on both the very conservative standard of living 
defined by the low cost budget and the modest but adequate standard defined by the 
modest cost budget for a wide range of household types. For any nominated 
household type, this essentially involves deducting the appropriate budget standard 
from the household income, leaving a residual that is available to cover housing costs. 
However, getting a measure of the relevant income is easier said than done as there 
is the matter of taxes and income sources; that is, on top of any labour market 
income, or if there is no such income, there are a whole range of pensions and 
benefits such as family allowances that have to be factored in. In the residual income 
method, it is a disposable income that faces the tension between housing and non-
housing necessities. This means that, to the extent that datasets and policy analysis 
are based upon gross household incomes, prototypical taxes and income-based 
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government benefits need to be computed as a function of income for every 
household type in order to determine the relevant disposable incomes and thus to fully 
operationalise a residual income standard. 
Thus, what the model does is calculate for any income level the amount of tax paid 
and any entitlements by way of benefits. The relevant tax (if any) is deducted from the 
income amount while benefits (if any) are added. This creates the disposable income 
from which either the LCBS or MCBS is deducted to produce the residual income 
available for home purchase or rent. Appendix 1 outlines in detail the features of the 
model and how taxes and benefits are incorporated into it. The Positioning Paper 
provides even further detail, in particular, how it is worked through for two household 
types, a single person and a couple with two children, which are used as case studies 
in this report. This modelling is complex and certain assumptions have to be made 
(again summarised in the Positioning Paper) but, for example, even for a couple with 
two children the residual income will be different depending on how an income is 
earned between the two adults; a household on $100 000 but with one adult head as 
the sole income earner will confront a different tax and allowance regime than one 
with both adult heads working. We adopt the latter. What details as to household 
types, benefits and taxes are plugged into the model can be modified as the policy 
environment changes, for example restructuring of benefits or new tax rates, and the 
AHURI template in principle allows for such changes. 
The home purchase and rental markets require separate models because the housing 
cost and income measures and assumptions that sit behind these tenures, and which 
are required to build the model, are different. For example, a renter’s income may be 
boosted by CRA, compared to a purchaser who gets no equivalent subsidy, while 
there are ongoing costs for owners (rates, repairs etc.) that renters do not have. So, in 
looking at the applications of the model, let’s start with home purchase and the first of 
the model’s applications. 
6.1 The home purchase model 
6.1.1 Maximum affordable mortgage repayments 
One of the paradoxes of recent housing affordability data is that posed by the 
question: If the home purchase affordability problem is so bad, how can low-moderate 
income households still afford to buy? The annual international affordability report by 
Demographia which compares median dwelling prices to household incomes for 1100 
or so cities inevitably has Australia as the least affordable country among those 
surveyed, and in 2010 it accounted for five of the top ten least affordable cities, with 
Hong Kong pipping Sydney and Melbourne for the number one position. Such data, 
along with the everyday observations of ordinary Australians, such as the dentist 
quoted at the beginning of this report, causes people to reflect on how is this all 
possible. 
A large part of the answer is in the weakness of benchmark methods of affordability 
as used by Demographia. Using the residual income method, we were able to 
calculate the maximum weekly mortgage costs affordable for household incomes 
above $30 000 per annum using, as with all purchase examples in this study, the 7 
per cent interest rate holding for Australia in early 2011. Here we illustrate the findings 
for a single income household (Figure 8), a childless couple (Figure 9) and a couple 
with two children (Figure 10). Each shows the weekly mortgage affordable for all 
incomes between $30 000 and $150 000 and for two versions of the budget standard 
(MCBS and LCBS) and for two 30 per cent benchmarks (gross and disposable 
income). Note that the vertical line is the 40th income percentile for this household 
type and for purchaser households only. It should be emphasised again that the 
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incomes on the horizontal axis are the gross incomes, while that which is modelled to 
give the residual income removes relevant taxes and adds in any allowances such as 
child payments. 
Figure 8: Maximum affordable mortgage repayments using two types of budget 
standard and two measures of housing affordability, single person household, 2010 
 
Source: Modelled data using SPRC budget standards indexed to 2010 using composite index 
The findings are significant. First, as illustrated in Figure 8 above, a single person 
willing to live on the MCBS can afford to pay much more per week on housing than if 
the 30 per cent of income was used as benchmark for capacity to afford. Thus, a 
single person whose income was at the 40th percentile cut-off ($52 000) could afford 
a mortgage repayment, if he or she were willing to live to the MCBS, of around $360 a 
week and $410 if the LCBS is used. This compares to $200 if the 30 per cent 
disposable income benchmark is used. The $410 repayment capacity would enable 
such a household to borrow around $260 000 compared to $125 000. The former in 
most Australian cities could gain you the ability to purchase even if it is only a single 
bedroom unit. The latter would not. This suggests that for certain household types, 
properties are affordable when the benchmark method has been telling us they are 
not. A simple plugging in of data to any financial institution’s mortgage calculator will 
reveal that they recognise this and have clearly departed from any semblance of a 
benchmark method, although since the global financial crisis they have tightened their 
lending criteria. The Commonwealth Bank calculator as of May 2010 would, for 
example, lend to a household with a $50 000 income and no other debt a mortgage 
with annual repayments of $19 764, which represents 39.5 per cent of income. The 
basis for calculation is unclear, but one suspects some form of a residual income 
model. However, such calculators appear not to be household type specific, and there 
is potential to use the residual methods to evolve more accurate mortgage 
affordability calculators. 
The greater capacity to pay than suggested by the benchmark method becomes even 
stronger as incomes increase. Many people have speculated on how moderate 
(although not necessarily low) income homebuyers have been able to afford the high 
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prices of recent years, particularly if they are first-time purchasers who do not have 
more than a minimum deposit. The residual income method offers an explanation. On 
an income of $65 000 p.a., a single person would only be able to borrow $255 000 if 
they are not to exceed 30 per cent of their income. Using the MCBS, however, they 
could afford to borrow up to $368 000 which enables much more active participation in 
the housing market. This person might be living modestly to achieve the latter loan 
size but, provided there were no other issues that affected their expenditures (e.g. 
maintenance payments to children of a previous marriage), they could afford the 
repayments if this is how they chose to set their priorities. Of course, the further one 
moves up the income scale, the more it could be argued that the MCBS is too modest 
for such groups and they would spend more on other items. That is very likely the 
case, but what the budget standard does show is the maximum potential for dwelling 
purchase if a household was willing to make the expenditure sacrifices. If there was 
no departure from the MCBS or only a smallish departure, it would be possible for 
single person households on a good but not excessive income, for example $80 000, 
to afford to borrow around $600 000, creating the potential to be a very active player 
in the housing market. These figures in some cases do imply very high debt to income 
ratios, in some cases more than 50 per cent, but it is not the ratio per se that is the 
risk element, it is the capacity to pay. 
Figure 9 below models the outcome for a childless couple. Here there is an additional 
household member for expenditure to relate to so that, for any given income, the 
housing cost affordable per week is lower irrespective of whether it is LCBS or MCBS, 
although for purchasers we tend to prefer the MCBS as the standard given that 
purchasers tend to be on higher incomes than renters and are likely to use some of 
that additional income on non-basic expenditures. The figure also shows the 40th 
percentile for all income earners for this household type with the fact that it is so high 
in itself being a measure of the barrier to purchase, that is, a household type of this 
composition requires an income greater then average to be a purchaser. A more 
affordable market would have the 40th purchaser percentile at a much lower income 
level. 
Figure 9: Maximum affordable mortgage repayments using two types of budget 
standard and two measures of housing affordability, childless couple, 2010 
 
Source: Modelled data using SPRC budget standards indexed to 2010 using composite index 
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Now let us look at another family type: a couple with two children. The important point 
to remember here is that the benchmark method ignores the number of family 
members, whereas the budget standards build in the additional expenditures 
generated by a larger family. Figure 10 below shows very different results to that of a 
single person household. While the low cost residual income is still above both 
benchmark measures for all incomes, the modest residual income (the most relevant 
for purchasers) is below both of them until around the $85 000 to $90 000 income 
point. In short, families require a relatively high income to participate in the home 
purchase market and may be competing with singles or childless couples who have 
much higher residual incomes and therefore affordability capacity. Moreover, they 
have fewer dwellings to choose from as they will need at least a three-bedroom 
dwelling, while smaller family types can choose smaller dwellings but can also 
compete for the larger ones if they so want. What this all says is that the additional 
living expenses of households with children constrain their ability to borrow and 
therefore to afford housing even in lower price areas. This analysis is consistent with 
the findings of Hulse et al. (2010, Ch.5) who, in their research on changes in low-
moderate income home purchasing patterns, noted a sharp decline in the number of 
purchasers who are households with children and a very big increase in the proportion 
who are single person, single income households, with these changes being much 
greater than explainable by demographic change alone. When this information is 
applied to actual housing markets (see Section 5.3.3), the analysis has even more 
salience. 
Figure 10: Maximum affordable mortgage repayments using two types of budget 
standard and two measures of housing affordability, couple with two children, 2010 
 
Source: Modelled data using SPRC budget standards indexed to 2010 using composite index 
Figure 9 also indicated that if the MCBS is used as the measure for purchasers, then 
below an $85 000 income a family is essentially out of the housing market as this 
suggests capacity to afford a loan of around $400 a week that would enable the 
purchase of a house for about $250 000, perhaps a possibility in regional areas with 




The method suggests there is much greater capacity for households to afford housing 
at the prices prevailing in Australia than benchmark methods indicate, and therefore 
simplistic measures such as those of Demographia, which ignore household 
composition and the costs of other goods and services, may distort or disguise the 
real situation. For the growing number of smaller households in Australia, the 
affordability situation may not be as bad as surface impressions suggest, with many 
having substantial ability to afford what objectively might seem very high prices. On 
the other hand, for the larger moderate income families there is a problem even worse 
than suggested by budget standard methods. This latter point is made even more 
visible by subsequent analysis. 
6.2 Home purchase affordability price points 
The next application of this model which follows logically from the above is the 
identification of affordability price points. The model enables identification of the price 
point that may be deemed affordable, given interest rates and deposit assumptions, 
for all relevant household types and income ranges. A price point is that price 
whereby a property is deemed affordable. It is a concept which has meaning to the 
building and development industry in a way that an abstract notion such as a 
‘benchmark measure of income to price’ does not, although the latter can be 
converted into a price point. 
Figure 11 below shows the affordable loan price point for a single person and family 
(couple and two children), assuming a 7 per cent interest rate and a 25-year loan 
period, and highlights the different price points of the residual income method 
compared to the MCBS which is the method used for subsequent home purchase 
analysis. For purchasers, it is assumed that the MCBS is more appropriate than the 
LCBS, particularly as incomes rise. 
For the single income household, the affordable mortgage using the MCBS is 
$335 000. If a 10 per cent deposit was assumed, this would create a dwelling price 
point of $368 500, or $400 200 if a 20 per cent deposit was assumed. This is much 
higher than indicated by either of the ratio/benchmark methods. By comparison, the 
affordable price points are much lower than for the couple with two children and, 
importantly, even up to the $75 000 income point the figure shows that the ratio 
method overstates their capacity to purchase. Even families on what might seem an 
adequate household income could be struggling if pushed beyond relevant price 
points. 
For single person households it is interesting to note how the price points for the two 
incomes, $65 000 and $75 000 (yielding dwelling prices of $368 500 and $465 500 
respectively), are close to the advertised prices for many new one and two-bedroom 
apartments in our capital cities. It is as if the industry has used similar thinking to 
guide its production and pricing decisions. 
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Figure 11: Affordable loan price points at nominated income levels, different family 
types, 2010 
 
Source: Modelled data using SPRC budget standards indexed to 2010 using composite index 
While not central to the theme of this report with its emphasis more on first-time home 
purchase opportunity, Figure 12 below provides the basis for looking at the impact on 
the market of second and subsequent home buyers who have greater levels of equity 
to bring to the purchase process. Using the example of a single person household, it 
shows how current market prices, which some find hard to comprehend, are easily 
reached. Thus, a single person on $90 000, such as many professionals, and with a 
40 per cent deposit ($240 000 in this case) could afford an $840 000 dwelling. If on a 
$100 000 income, that affordability goes up to $1 million. This could be someone who 
at the age of 28 purchased, with a loan of $120 000, a unit in, say, 1996 for $135 000 
(then the Melbourne unit median) and 15 years later uses the equity in that property 
(now worth the Melbourne unit median of $423 000) to trade up. With that equity and 
a willingness to live to the MCBS they can trade up to a quite expensive dwelling. This 
in part is due to the sizeable equity enabled by dwelling price inflation and indicates 
how the market up to a point feeds on its past history of growth. In the process it is 
increasingly driving first-time buyers out of the market and potentially creating a recipe 
for a market slowdown. This is illustrated by making the link between the concept of 
price points and what renters as potential first-time buyers can afford. 
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Figure 12: Affordable housing price points in different deposit assumptions, single 
person, 2010 
 
Source: Modelled data using SPRC budget standards indexed to 2010 using composite index 
Figure 13 below suggests an exploratory but more nuanced way of understanding the 
effects of affordability on housing demand than hitherto has been the case, even in 
the National Housing Supply Council (2010, p.194) analysis of affordability of renters. 
It shows the income distribution range of renters in the age cohorts 18–50 (potential 
purchasers) for our two case study households plus childless couples, the largest 
population group in the private rental sector. Renters represent the bulk of potential 
first-time buyers. This concept of potential first-time buyers excludes those who are 
living at home with parents and have the capacity to go directly into ownership, and 
recent arrivals from overseas who also have the ability to go directly into ownership 
(e.g. business migrants). 
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Figure 13: Capacity for home purchase: Income distribution of three private renter 
households and affordability price points, 2010 
 
Source: Modelled data using SPRC budget standards indexed to 2010 using composite index 
Assuming renter households could put together a 10 per cent deposit (in itself a 
hurdle for lower income ones) and finance a 25-year loan at 7 per cent interest, the 
figure suggests how many could in principle afford transition to ownership. This is 
achieved by reading up the dotted lines for four relevant residual income price points 
of $40 000, $60 000, $90 000 and $120 000. This shows the dwelling price affordable 
at that income point for each household type based on the MCBS and therefore the 
potential size of the market at that same point for each household type. Visually the 
difference is clear: as house prices increase, the household income point necessary 
to achieve ownership is pushed further and further to the right such that there are 
fewer and fewer renters able to purchase. 
Thus, at the $60 000 income point, a single person household could buy something 
up to $329 000, with around 40 per cent of singles (all those above the $60 000 
income point) able to afford such a price. By contrast, a couple with two children at the 
same $60 000 income price point could only afford a $68 000 dwelling, of which there 
would be none in Australia. Even so, around 35 per cent of renter couples with 
children could not even afford this amount. It is not until a household income of 
$90 000 is reached that prices remotely in the range of the Melbourne median are 
affordable for a couple and two children. At $90 000 and a related price point of 
$323 000, around 70 per cent of couples and children are out of the market; at the 
same point a $585 000 property is affordable for singles, but less than a quarter would 
still be in the market. Couples, the largest group in the rental market, could afford up 
to $585 000 and at this price some 40 per cent would still be in the market. A 
$120 000 household income would buy a $530 000 property for a family and an 
$800 000 plus property for both singles and couples, but at this point the market has 
declined substantially. For singles and couples with two children, it is now in the order 
of less than 10 per cent, while for couples about 20 per cent of that market is left. 
What the data suggests and again in a very exploratory way (it would need to be 
fleshed out for all household types) is that, given the current level of dwelling prices 
and interest rates, we would appear to be close to the point where first-time buyer 
demand cannot be sustained, particularly for new family accommodation on the urban 
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fringe. Prices for new dwellings have reached a point where many households, most 
notably families, are out of the market. Using Melbourne as the example where new 
dwellings (a house and land package) on the urban fringe are commonly in the range 
of $370 000 to $500 000, probably less than 20 per cent of couples with children who 
are renting could be in the market in these price ranges. Above $500 000 the market 
for first-time buyers’ families is very small, but still reasonably large for couples and 
singles. In this environment, a lack of demand for new construction will continue to be 
subdued for the foreseeable future so long as prices and interest rates remain around 
the levels of 2010–11. Prices must ultimately reach their affordability limits, and this 
analysis suggests we are getting very close to them. The growth in new demand must 
come from existing purchasers or investors. 
The situation is somewhat better for established dwellings, but not a great deal, as 
Section 6.3 discusses. 
6.3 Reshaping housing opportunity: share of houses sold in 
2010 with affordable purchase prices 
The question was raised earlier: If the home purchase affordability problem is so bad, 
how can low-moderate income households still afford to buy? As demonstrated 
above, the residual income method suggests that many household types (notably 
smaller households) have greater capacity to afford purchase than the benchmark 
methods of affordability suggest. But the other reason why many low-moderate 
income households can afford to buy is that many properties sell for less than the 
metropolitan median, with many submarkets having local median prices some 30 per 
cent below this. These locations are clearly more affordable. 
To some extent this principle is recognised in the NAHA ratio (30%) indicator of house 
price affordability which measures the proportion of homes sold that were affordable 
to moderate income households, that is, those on less than the 40 per cent decile 
where this is equivalised (adjusted) for the relevant family type. For example, this 
revealed that in Melbourne in 2007–08 (based on a small sample) around 37 per cent 
of dwellings sold were affordable by moderate income households. However, what 
this data does not show is (a) where these properties are located and the implications 
for policy and (b) the differences in household types in their ability to purchase across 
different submarkets. 
Thus, the next part of this study is to examine the differences in affordability across 
metropolitan areas using the residual income method and again looking at the 
circumstance of different household types. Given a methodology that is household-
specific in its measurement of affordability, the obvious hypothesis is that certain 
household types have greater housing choice across the various submarkets than 
others. 
The two metropolitan areas we are looking at in this study are Melbourne and 
Adelaide, and for each city their housing markets have been broken into broad 
regional areas reflecting distance from the CBD. In Melbourne, because of its larger 
geographical area, there are four areas: inner city, middle ring, outer urban and 
growth area, and in Adelaide three: inner, middle and outer. The boundaries of these 
areas are somewhat arbitrary and quite different from city to city as a result of their 
different geographies, history and size. Figure 14 below shows the areas of the two 
cities. 
Development in Melbourne has taken place in a broad arc largely unimpeded by 
geography, except of course by Port Phillip Bay. Unlike Sydney, Melbourne’s water 
line is not penetrated by rivers and bays which greatly affect accessibility in that city. 
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Nor is it hemmed in by mountain ranges except to the east where the urban fringe 
runs into the Dandenongs. Adelaide, like Melbourne, is not hindered to any degree by 
mountains except again to the east in the form of the Adelaide Ranges, and its flat 
geography enables growth in any direction away from the coast on which it is located. 
The geography of the two cities and their relative flatness mean that housing 
submarkets are much less complex than, say, that of Sydney where the many rivers, 
bays, inlets and hillier topography affect accessibility, attractiveness and amenity in 
highly nuanced ways. 
Figure 14: Regions of Adelaide and Melbourne, 2011 
 
As in all Australian cities, much of inner Melbourne and Adelaide up to the 1980s was 
given over to industry, including manufacturing and light engineering, and the inner 
areas of mixed industrial and residential use in the post-war period were not seen as 
desirable areas to live in, with property values reflecting this. At the same time, the 
attractions of suburbia with the new house and car meant that the outer areas had 
considerable demand (Forster 2004). 
Over recent decades, the inner and middle ring suburbs of Australian cities have 
become much more valued as places of residence. Households have changed their 
perceptions of the more and less desirable places to live, while developers and 
builders have to a degree responded with shifts in where new property is built and in 
what form. The inner urban areas, in particular, have become much more attractive to 
both households and developers; by contrast, outer urban living does not have the 
same appeal as in the past and is seen by many to be increasingly problematic 
(Dodson & Sipe 2008). As a result, most inner urban areas have now been gentrified 
(Atkinson et al. 2011). This locational restructuring is explained by interrelated 
demographic, social, economic and policy changes which have been identified 
elsewhere (e.g. Flood & Baker 2009; Baum et al. 2006). 
The important point is that these changes have been paralleled by, and perhaps 
reinforced by, a fundamental restructuring of dwelling prices such that where inner 
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urban areas were once the cheapest areas of a city they are now among the most 
expensive. 
As outlined in Burke and Hulse (2010), one long-established way of understanding the 
dynamics of housing submarkets is through a bid rent curve which graphs variations 
in land or property prices as distance increases from some point in a property market, 
usually the CBD. The point at which rents or prices are most intense reflects the most 
desirable locations (Alonso 1964). To illustrate both the concept and how 
fundamentally Australian housing markets and associated household opportunities 
have been restructured, Figure 15 below shows the bid rent or price curve for the 
eastern corridor of Melbourne for 1981 and 2010. 
Figure 15: Melbourne eastern corridor house price curve, 1981 and 2010 (2010 constant 
prices) 
 
Source: Victorian Valuer General’s Property Sales Statistics 1981–2010 (unit record files) 
In 1981, the eastern corridor house price curve was relatively flat with a slight bulge in 
the affluent middle ring suburbs of Hawthorn and Camberwell. Inner urban Richmond 
was slightly cheaper than Bayswater, 28 kilometres from the CBD. 
By 2010, prices were much higher in general but considerably so in the inner and 
middle ring suburbs, with the suburbs toward the fringe being dramatically lower. The 
bulge in the middle ring suburbs, particularly those eight to 12 kilometres from the 
CBD, has become much more marked, reflecting the increasing premium on CBD 
access. This pattern was little different across the other corridors of Melbourne (Hulse 
& Burke 2010) and suggests spatial polarisation of the housing market in that 
households had a wide choice of affordable properties in 1981 but by 2010, for those 
on more moderate incomes, the choices were much more limited, the degree to which 
is assessed below. 
Adelaide traces a different pattern to Melbourne but does not invalidate the price 
curve thesis that properties should be more expensive closer to the city. The price in 
both cases is for houses only, in recognition that Adelaide does not have many 
apartments while Melbourne, notably in the inner city, does, and therefore an all-
dwelling comparison would not be appropriate. Melbourne house prices are higher 
than Adelaide’s at any distance from the city and have that bulge in the middle 
suburbs, while those of Adelaide decline progressively from the CBD until about 12 
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kilometres out where they have a slight kick up and then trail away again, but only 
moderately. The premium on proximity to the CBD has worn off much earlier in 
Adelaide than in Melbourne, which is what one would expect in a smaller city. 
Figure 16: Adelaide and Melbourne house price curves: Corridors in 1981 and 2008 
(2008 constant prices) 
 
Source: Victorian and South Australian Valuer General’s Property Sales Statistics 2010 (unit record files) 
With this brief context, we can now look at the degree to which different households 
(assuming first-time ownership) are constrained in their ability to purchase across 
these broad regional areas. 
By taking the residual income and associated mortgage capacity for a given 
household type and applying the modelled mortgage capacity to the Valuer General’s 
unit record sales data for each jurisdiction, it is possible to determine where 
households for any given income can purchase. Figure 17 below uses the Valuer 
General’s data for Melbourne and Adelaide to overview their respective total markets 
prior to regional analysis. In Melbourne the data is for all properties while for Adelaide 
it is for houses only. The analysis is undertaken again with just two household types 
(singles and childless couples) who are potential first-time purchasers. 
The figure highlights two major points. The first (reaffirming what the modelled data in 
Section 6.1 suggests) is that first-time ownership for families is difficult. In both 
markets, nothing in 2010 was affordable by a couple with two children before around 
$75 000 was earned, and even $90 000 could purchase less than 20 per cent of the 
market. Only when income exceeds $100 000 in Adelaide and $115 000 in Melbourne 
is at least 50 per cent of the market available. For singles the market is much more 
affordable and the entry point is around $40 000 to $45 000 but improves substantially 
over $60 000. The second point is that Adelaide not surprisingly is more affordable 
than Melbourne, but more so for higher income earners of either family type, 
suggesting a flatter market in Adelaide such that those on higher incomes have more 
choice. The lower 40 per cent of the market is much more similar for both cities. 
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Figure 17: Affordable housing in Melbourne and Adelaide: Singles and couples with two 
children, MCBS, 2010 
 
Source: South Australian and Victorian Valuer Generals’ Property Sales Statistics 2010 (unit record files) 
(mortgage to purchase affordable properties assumes 7.4% interest rate. 25-year loan period. 10% 
deposit) 
This aggregated data still does not tell us about the submarkets, so let’s now make 
that switch. 
Figures 18 and 19 below show the percentage of Melbourne properties affordable to a 
single first-time purchaser (Figure 18) and a couple with two children (Figure 19), 
revealing the degree to which few properties are affordable for either household type 
anywhere below $50 000 ($80 000 for the family) and the differences between regions 
in affordability generally and between household types. The growth areas of 
Melbourne are almost universally affordable for both household types so long as they 
have around $85 000 household income, but affordability drops away sharply for inner 
city and middle ring locations where families need an income of $120 000 plus to have 
any real market choice. 
 
 46 
Figure 18: Percentage of Melbourne properties affordable to single person households, 
MCBS, 2010 
 
Figure 19: Percentage of Melbourne properties affordable to couple with two children, 
MCBS, 2010 
 
Source: Victorian Valuer Generals’ Property Sales Statistics 2010 (unit record files) (mortgage to 
purchase affordable properties assumes 7.4% interest rate, 25-year loan period, 10% deposit) 
The information in Figures 18 and 19 is given sharper resolution in Table 13 which 
shows for singles, couples and couples with two children the proportion of properties 
available in each of the regions and for different income levels, but this time compared 
with the 30 per cent rule (disposable income). This shows a reasonable degree of 
similarity between the two methods for singles. For example, at $50 000, 27 per cent 
of properties are available using the MCBS and 28 per cent using disposable income. 
But, of course, singles do not have other household members to divert potential 
housing expenditure, and thus when we go to couples with two children at $50 000 
there is nothing affordable on the LCBS, while the 30 per cent rule would say that 44 
per cent of the stock is affordable. The second point is that regional differences are 
less sharp for singles and to a lesser degree couples than for families (couple and two 
children). Thus, at $60 000 for a single on the MCBS, 79 per cent of the fringe is 
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affordable, and 37 per cent of the inner city and 30 per cent of the middle ring. 
However, it takes up to $100 000 for a family to have any real choice at all, with most 
of that being on the fringe (90%) and outer suburbs (86%). Most importantly, the data 
reaffirms the affordability problems of lower income households. Below $40 000 for all 
three family types, using the MCBS, virtually nothing is purchasable where the 30/40 
rule would say there is, and ironically most so for families. Note that the shading in 
Table 13 identifies income level and location combinations that are highly 
unaffordable. 
Table 13: Percentage of Melbourne properties affordable for purchase to singles, 




30% rule: disposable income, single 
person household 
 Inner Middle Outer Fringe Melb. Inner Middle Outer Fringe Melb. 
$10,000 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
$20,000 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 1% 1% 1% 
$30,000 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 5% 2% 3% 4% 3% 
$40,000 5% 2% 3% 4% 3% 9% 5% 11% 19% 11% 
$50,000 16% 11% 30% 44% 27% 17% 11% 32% 46% 28% 
$60,000 37% 30% 69% 79% 55% 20% 14% 39% 54% 33% 
$75,000 62% 61% 92% 93% 78% 43% 36% 77% 84% 61% 
$100,000 81% 85% 98% 98% 91% 62% 61% 92% 93% 78% 
$150,000 93% 96% 100% 99% 97% 82% 86% 98% 98% 92% 
 Couple MCBS 30% rule: disposable income, couple 
 Inner Middle Outer Fringe Melb. Inner Middle Outer Fringe Melb. 
$10,000 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 3% 1% 2% 2% 2% 
$20,000 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 6% 2% 4% 5% 4% 
$30,000 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 8% 4% 7% 13% 8% 
$40,000 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 11% 6% 15% 24% 15% 
$50,000 4% 1% 2% 3% 2% 20% 13% 38% 53% 32% 
$60,000 17% 11% 32% 46% 28% 24% 16% 46% 61% 38% 
$75,000 50% 45% 84% 88% 68% 48% 42% 82% 87% 66% 
$100,000 79% 82% 97% 98% 90% 67% 68% 94% 95% 82% 
$150,000 93% 96% 100% 99% 97% 84% 87% 98% 98% 93% 
 
Couple with two children, MCBS 
30% rule: disposable income, couple with 
two children 
 Inner Middle Outer Fringe Melb. Inner Middle Outer Fringe Melb. 
$10,000 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 8% 3% 7% 12% 7% 
$20,000 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 11% 6% 14% 22% 14% 
$30,000 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 14% 8% 22% 34% 21% 
$40,000 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 18% 12% 33% 48% 29% 
$50,000 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 28% 21% 54% 68% 44% 
$60,000 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 31% 24% 60% 73% 48% 
$75,000 7% 3% 6% 11% 7% 50% 45% 84% 88% 68% 
$100,000 53% 49% 86% 90% 71% 68% 70% 95% 95% 83% 
$150,000 87% 91% 99% 99% 95% 84% 87% 98% 98% 93% 
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Tables 14 and 15 below provide another way of looking at the affordability problem, 
showing for all properties in Melbourne and for houses only in Adelaide (here there 
are too few apartments to provide meaningful data) the income that is necessary to 
afford the median dwelling in each of the regions of the two cities using the LCBS. 
One interesting observation is that while a single person needs an income of $89 000 
to buy in inner Melbourne, they need $105 000 in inner Adelaide. This highlights an 
important point, discussed in Section 9, as to the need for dwelling diversity. 
Melbourne, compared to Adelaide, had the advantage of the flat boom in the 1960s 
and 1970s that provided substantial diversity of stock which, to a large extent, 
Adelaide missed out on, with its much more compact urban form at that time not 
acting as a driver for as much multi-unit accommodation. On top of that has been the 
one and two-bedroom high rise boom in Melbourne since the early 1990s which is 
now beginning to appear on a much lesser scale in Adelaide. But without that diversity 
in the inner city of Adelaide, purchasers have to look to more expensive detached 
housing for choice. This is a problem that growth areas on the fringes of Melbourne 
and Adelaide are in danger of replicating. 
It is in the middle ring suburbs that Adelaide achieves its affordability. There the 
median is only $455 000 compared to Melbourne’s $620 000, this amount 
representing for any household type, but particularly moderate income families, a 
major affordability barrier. Many moderate income households in Adelaide can still 
enjoy the benefits of purchase reasonably close to the city, whereas those in 
Melbourne cannot. 
Table 14: Income required to purchase median priced dwelling, Melbourne regions, 
2010 
Median dwelling price 
Inner Middle Outer Fringe Melbourne 
$585,200 $620,000 $420,000 $377,000 $460,000 
Single $89,000 $94,000 $70,000 $65,000 $74,000 
Sole parent 1 child $100,000 $104,000 $77,000 $72,000 $82,000 
Sole parent 2 children $117,000 $121,000 $92,000 $87,000 $97,000 
Couple $95,000 $99,000 $78,000 $73,000 $82,000 
Couple 1 child $110,000 $114,000 $90,000 $85,000 $94,000 
Couple 2 children $123,000 $127,000 $102,000 $95,000 $109,000 
Couple 3 children $142,000 $147,000 $123,000 $118,000 $128,000 
Source: Victorian Valuer General’s Property Sales Statistics 2010 (unit record files) (mortgage to 
purchase affordable properties assumes 7.4% interest rate, 25-year loan period, 10% deposit) 
Table 15: Income required to purchase median priced dwelling, Adelaide regions, 2010 
Median dwelling price 
Inner Middle Outer Adelaide 
$710,000 $455,000 $321,500 $400,000 
Single $105,000 $74,000 $59,000 $68,000 
Sole parent 1 child $116,000 $81,000 $66,000 $75,000 
Sole parent 2 children $133,000 $96,000 $80,000 $89,000 
Couple $109,000 $81,000 $67,000 $75,000 
Couple 1 child $124,000 $93,000 $79,000 $88,000 
Couple 2 children $137,000 $108,000 $89,000 $98,000 
Couple 3 children 
Outside 
scope 
$127,000 $109,000 $121,000 
Source: South Australian Valuer General’s Property Sales Statistics 2010 (unit record files) (mortgage to 
purchase affordable properties assumes 7.4% interest rate, 25-year loan period, 10% deposit) 
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In summary, what this exploratory analysis tells us to date for first-time buyers is: 
 The residual income measure suggests (compared to the benchmark method) that 
capacity to pay (and therefore potential demand) is greater than thought, for some 
household types more than 50 per cent greater. 
 The greater capacity to purchase comes from smaller (childless) households on 
relatively good incomes. 
 Low income families (i.e. those below income of $40 000) in Melbourne and 
Adelaide are now completely out of the first home purchase market. Virtually 
nothing is affordable. Low income singles and couples (same income) still have 
opportunities for purchase, but these are spatially constrained and likely to be for 
older lower quality flats rather than new demand. 
 Moderate income families ($40 000 to $80 000) can still purchase, but only in very 
spatially constrained markets, largely in outer suburbs (Adelaide and Melbourne) 
and the fringes of metropolitan Melbourne. 
 Moderate income singles (same income as above) have much greater dwelling 
choice and can still purchase in the inner city and middle ring. 
 Higher income families ($80 000 plus) have much increased choice although 
substantially more so once household incomes exceed $100 000, when at least 
50 per cent of inner city and middle ring properties in Melbourne are affordable. 
 For higher income singles and couples, the world is their oyster; once an income 
of $80 000 plus is achieved, substantial choice becomes available in both cities. 
 The broadest lesson here is that if you want to be a first-time home owner in the 
inner city or middle ring suburbs, particularly in Melbourne, do not have children. 
Of course, these observations have to be modified for second and subsequent 
purchasers who have built up a sizeable equity in their existing property, but in terms 
of first-time home purchase demand this analysis enables us to understand the 
Melbourne and Adelaide housing markets, and no doubt other Australian housing 
markets, much better. It is an understanding that the residential development sector 
appears to already have, given what they are currently building. 
The big market for new construction in the inner city and middle ring is for one and 
two-bedroom apartments as these can be built for around $350 000 to $600 000 
(around $1700 per square metre building cost) for which there is still sizeable 
purchase capacity among moderate to high income singles and couples. Larger 
apartments can rarely be built for less than this and, if they were, the price of 
$600 000 plus is not affordable for the household types that would desire such 
accommodation (i.e. families). Detached dwellings and large townhouses anywhere 
other than on the fringe have relatively limited new demand from first-time buyers. The 
demand has to largely come from existing owners who already have substantial 
equity. 
The market for family accommodation (i.e. detached dwellings, townhouses or larger 
apartments) can only be in outer areas where in Melbourne, for example, it is still 
possible to purchase a house and land package for $350 000 to $550 000, which is 
affordable by families with household income in excess of $90 000. 
This all suggests a market driven by differential affordability across household types 
which has important implications for urban form (and planning) as well as for the 
occupants of the dwellings that make up this urban form. These implications are 
drawn out in Section 9. 
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7 THE RENTAL MODEL 
In broad terms, the model for the rental market is the same as for home purchaser 
affordability. The difference is that because more tenants than purchasers are on low 
incomes, many households are entitled to pensions and benefits which in some cases 
become the dominant sources of income. The model therefore has to be adjusted for 
all the permutation of pensions and benefits as affected by age of applicants, number 
of children and relevant income eligibility tapers and cut-off points as incomes rise. 
Among such benefits is the CRA, and this too has to be factored in, given certain 
assumptions (see Appendix 1 for an overview of the treatment of pensions and 
benefits, and Appendix 4 for CRA). 
The data analysis here relates only to the Melbourne rental market for which detailed 
unit record data is available by rent, location, property type and bedroom size. This 
market has broadly been swept up in the market restructuring outlined in relation to 
home ownership reviewed in Section 5.1, but the impacts do not play out in quite the 
same way. Between 1945 and 1980, a disproportionate amount of Melbourne’s rental 
stock was located in the inner urban areas, largely due to an intensive period of 
flat/apartment development in the 1960s and 1970s, mostly in the form of one and 
two-bedroom units (Archer 1980). In 1981 for example, 44 per cent of inner 
Melbourne stock was private rental, with another 9.5 per cent public housing (Burke et 
al. 1985, ch.1). Most of this was apartments, although around Melbourne University 
and RMIT there was a sizeable stock of older terrace houses used as cheap student 
rental. 
By 2006, the rental stock in the inner city had fallen in relative terms but still was 
larger in absolute numbers than in 1981, with some major transformations. New 
commercial and residential areas (Southbank and Docklands) around the CBD have 
been developed since the late 1980s with much of this new stock being high rise, 
some of which was relatively expensive rental. Much of the rental stock made up of 
old houses in the inner area has been converted to expensive owner-occupied 
dwellings or pulled down and replaced with expensive townhouses. Both reflect the 
gentrification processes impacting on the area. Many of the now 30- to 40-year-old 
‘six-pack’ apartments (two storeys, with six to eight units compressed onto one block 
of land) have been moved up market by virtue of renewal or simply by intense price 
pressures from the international student market and the growing number of young 
professionals wanting to live and work in the now attractive lifestyle suburbs of the 
inner city. However, they still represent some of Melbourne’s most affordable rental 
stock, although the term ‘affordability’ is very much a relative one. As Atkinson et al. 
(2011, p.30) found, the displacement rate of private renters in inner Melbourne in 
response to gentrification pressures does not mean displacement to the urban fringe 
but to areas contiguous to the inner city. This suggests the hypothesis that there is a 
much flatter bid rent curve for the rental market than that of the purchase market, 
meaning that the lower cost rental stock is slowly moving to the outer suburbs but is 
not yet concentrated in these locations as is the purchase stock. More often than not, 
rental stock beyond the inner city is in the form of a detached dwelling that three or 
more decades ago would have been constructed for ownership. More generally, and 
as part of an Australia-wide process, the stock of lower end rental accommodation in 
Melbourne is contracting, with pressures on rents and problems of availability (Wulff et 
al. 2011). 
Figure 20 below shows the rent curve for three-bedroom houses for the same corridor 
of Melbourne as used for home purchase (Figure 15) and confirms that, as yet, the 
market restructuring of Melbourne has not hit the rental market to the same degree. 
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Rent levels in real terms have been pushed up for the full length of the corridor and 
more so for the inner and middle ring locations, but in the case of the latter nowhere 
near as much as for dwelling prices. 
Figure 20: Melbourne eastern corridor rent curve: Three-bedroom houses, 2000 and 
2010 (2010 constant prices) 
 
7.1 Rental affordability 
Figure 21 below shows, for a couple with two children, the difference the model 
makes when applied to rental and again as compared with the benchmark method. 
The rental model is more complex as CRA has to be modelled into the income 
position with the effect of cut-ins, tapers and cut-outs of income support and benefits 
such that the increase in incomes for any household type is not linear. 
As with ownership, this data clearly reveals differences between the benchmark 
model and the budget standard model. Using a couple with two children as the 
example, it would suggest that above some income level, that is, $45 000 using the 
LCBS but a high $90 000 using the MCBS, they can afford more by way of rent than 
indicated by the benchmark method, with the difference widening as incomes 
increase. By contrast, below some minimum level of income, again around $40 000, 
the opposite holds true: the disposable income benchmark method (the one most 
equivalent to the budget standard) overstates the degree of affordability. By contrast, 
if the gross benchmark method is used, the LCBS and it are very similar. 
Second, and related to these differences, is that the budget standard method offers a 
better explanation of the rental market dynamics. One of the puzzles of recent years 
has been how rents have been able to increase to the degree that they have done, 
given the extent of income resistance that would be suggested by the benchmark 
method, that is, lack of affordability should have acted as a drag on the rental market. 
That this has not been the case is suggested by the budget standard method which 
indicates an ability of a couple with two children on a household income over $45 000 
(data not shown) to pay more than we previously thought was affordable. For singles, 
this amount is $30 000 and, given that they are a sizeable proportion of rental 
households, their market influence would be substantial. 
Third, if the MCBS is used, a couple with two children on less than $60 000 has 
minimum capacity to afford a rental property at all, and, if the LCBS is used, any rent 
higher than $230 a week is unaffordable. In short, below a certain point the private 
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market is effectively not accessible. This is really no surprise as awareness of the 
problem of private rental housing failing to meet lower income needs was, back in the 
1920s and 1930s, one of the major rationales for social housing provision in Australia 
and internationally. Today the problem does not create the same immediacy for policy 
action as it did then, perhaps because in that era the lack of affordability in private 
rental was overlaid by problems of quality and slum formation (Harloe 1995, ch.3). 
Also, the numbers of renters were much greater and the composition different, that is, 
many more families, and perhaps because this is no longer the case the political risks 
of inaction are lower. 
Figure 21: Rental affordability using different affordability measures, couple with two 
children 
 
Source: Modelled data using SPRC budget standards indexed to 2010 using composite index 
The test of the size of the affordability problem is to see what happens when the 
modelled residual income data is applied to the actual housing market. 
Victoria has a Residential Tenancies Bond Authority (RTBA) which holds all 
residential tenancy bonds for rental properties, including long-term caravans and 
rooming houses, houses and flats. The bonds are held in trust for landlords/agents 
and tenants, or owners and residents, giving all parties an equal say in how they 
should be repaid when a rental agreement (lease) ends. When a new lease is taken 
on, the landlord or agent provides the RTBA with the bond along with information 
including property type, number of bedrooms, rent and address. Confidentialised 
RTBA unit records thus enable us to calculate for each household type the 
percentage of appropriate dwelling units available for Melbourne, using the LCBS, 
MCBS and 30/40 benchmark method. 
The following tables analyse a single person childless couple and a couple with two 
children, and apply the Canadian National Occupancy Standard which has been used 
to set minimum standards for each household type. Thus a couple with two children, 
in addition to facing an affordability constraint, face an availability one as they are 
ineligible for one or two-bedroom properties under this standard.4 The data does not 
include boarding houses as a potential option as these are deemed not to be long-
                                               
4
 This ignores the Canadian rule that children under 18 of the same sex can share a bedroom. 
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term rental. The postcodes of the rental addresses have been amalgamated into 
inner, middle, outer and fringe areas of Melbourne on the same basis as the purchase 
regions (see Appendix 3). Relevant rent assistance is factored into the residual 
income model on the formula provided in Appendix 4. 
Table 16 below highlights how sensitive the analysis is to the chosen budget standard 
and illustrates the problem of which to choose to reflect market and household 
realities. Taking the example of a couple on $40 000, if the LCBS is used, 71 per cent 
of all rental stock is affordable, but only 2 per cent if the MCBS is used. Above 
$60 000 (or in reality somewhere between $50 000 and $75 000), the results from 
each of the methods become much closer, illustrating that this income range is a 
transition zone between having affordability pressures and not. For subsequent 
analysis (with the exception of Table 16) we will use the harsher measure (the LCBS) 
and compare it to the most equivalent benchmark method, disposable income. Note 
that shading in Table 16 identifies income level and location combinations that are 
highly unaffordable. 
Table 16: Percentage of affordable rental properties by region, LCBS and MCBS, 
Melbourne, couple, 2010 
Income 
LCBS MCBS 
Inner Middle Outer Fringe Melb. Inner Middle Outer Fringe Melb. 
$0 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
$10,000 4% 8% 12% 8% 8% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
$20,000 15% 25% 45% 44% 30% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
$30,000 28% 46% 76% 76% 52% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
$40,000 44% 68% 92% 91% 71% 1% 2% 4% 2% 2% 
$50,000 57% 78% 96% 96% 80% 5% 10% 14% 12% 10% 
$60,000 85% 94% 99% 99% 94% 52% 74% 94% 94% 76% 
$75,000 96% 98% 100% 100% 98% 88% 95% 100% 99% 95% 
$100,000 99% 100% 100% 100% 100% 98% 99% 100% 100% 99% 
Source: RTBA unit record files and relevant budget standard 
Table 17 below illustrates a story that is rarely told for lack of comparative data, and 
that is the relative affordability of rental versus ownership. On the supply side, the 
data is as good as one can get, including all properties for sale and all new rental 
properties in Melbourne in 2010. On the demand side, it is the same income available 
for rent or purchase as both use the MCBS which adjusts both incomes for all relevant 




Table 17: Percentage of affordable purchase and rental properties by region, Melbourne, 
MCBS Couple, 2010 
Income 
MCBS purchase MCBS rental 
Inner Middle Outer Fringe Melb. Inner Middle Outer Fringe Melb. 
$10,000 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
$20,000 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
$30,000 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
$40,000 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 2% 4% 2% 2% 
$50,000 4% 1% 2% 3% 2% 5% 10% 14% 12% 10% 
$60,000 17% 11% 32% 46% 28% 52% 74% 94% 94% 76% 
$75,000 50% 45% 84% 88% 68% 88% 95% 100% 99% 95% 
$100,000 79% 82% 97% 98% 90% 98% 99% 100% 100% 99% 
$150,000 93% 96% 100% 99% 97% NA NA NA NA NA 
In this table, we can use a couple as an example and compare for any level of income 
the different affordability offered by tenure across Melbourne. Below $40 000, the 
situation is grim, with neither rental nor purchase possible at an MCBS level. Above 
$50 000, 10 per cent of the rental market is affordable but only 2 per cent of the 
purchase market. Thereafter, the situation changes dramatically, notably for renters. 
At $60 000 household income, 76 per cent of all properties are rentable but only 28 
per cent for purchase. At $75 000, a couple have almost complete choice in rental and 
68 per cent choice in purchase. The real difference is spatial where, from $50 000 
upwards, opportunities open up for rental in the inner city and middle ring, but these 
properties are still constrained for purchase (e.g. 74% at $60 000 in the middle ring for 
rental but only 11% for purchase). The relative affordability of rental compared to 
purchase in inner city and middle ring locations suggests why many households 
cannot make the transition to purchase. For those with employment, family or 
community connections in the inner city, the only way to retain these is through rental. 
But even for, say, professionals on higher income who want to live in the inner city 
(perhaps for lifestyle choice as much as employment or family reasons), the choices 
offered by rental are much greater. A $75 000 income for a couple will give them a 
choice of 95 per cent of middle ring rental properties and 88 per cent of inner, where 
the respective percentages for purchase are 45 per cent and 55 per cent. The 
problem here is that as more and more of the higher income professionals remain in 
inner area rental for reasons of inability to purchase in their preferred lifestyle 
locations, they are occupying stock once used as lower income rental 
accommodation. The pressures on lower cost rental stock, as captured in Wulff et al.’s 
(2011) study, are intense. 
Tables 18, 19 and 20 return to the LCBS, which some would argue is more 
appropriate for rental. Not surprisingly, these show some similar features to the 
purchase data, but not as sharp. For example, for all three household types there are 
spatial constraints across the regional submarkets but to a lesser degree than 
purchase; more affordable rental accommodation is available in inner city and middle 
ring locations and at lower levels of income. For example, while virtually nothing is 
purchasable for any household below $50 000 in the inner city, this income level 
offers wide choice for single renters (76%) and even some choice for families (16%). 
The second point is the very big difference in affordability outcomes between 
household types when the LCBS is compared to the 30 per cent benchmark. For 
singles, the LCBS suggests much greater availability over $40 000 across all regions, 
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while under the benchmark method there is no real availability until $75 000. On the 
other hand, a couple and two children have much less availability up to $50 000 using 
the LCBS than the benchmark method, and what is available is disproportionately in 
the outer suburbs and fringe. In short, the benchmark method suggests a significant 
overstatement of rental choices for families. 
The third point follows from the point about where the stock is available. For lower 
income renter families (i.e. those families on less than $50 000), virtually nothing is 
available in the inner city and only a small amount (21% at $40 000) the middle ring. 
What the LCBS indicates is effective choice over $40 000 in the outer suburbs and 
fringe, meaning that the rental affordability patterns are beginning to mirror those of 
purchase. Moderate income renting families can only locate in outer areas that are 
also the domain of moderate income purchasers. 
A final point, and perhaps the most compelling, is that below the $40 000 household 
income point for singles (LCBS) and $30 000 for families there is minimal 
accommodation in the private rental market, even factoring in CRA. Only couples on 
low incomes appear to have some choice. 
Table 18: Percentage of affordable rental properties by region, Melbourne, single 
person, 2010 
Income 
LCBS 30% disposable income 
Inner Middle Outer Fringe Melb. Inner Middle Outer Fringe Melb. 
$0 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 2% 3% 1% 2% 
$10,000 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 4% 7% 4% 4% 
$20,000 2% 4% 7% 4% 4% 3% 6% 9% 6% 6% 
$30,000 4% 8% 11% 8% 7% 0% 1% 1% 0% 1% 
$40,000 43% 66% 91% 90% 69% 1% 3% 4% 2% 2% 
$50,000 76% 90% 99% 99% 90% 4% 8% 12% 8% 8% 
$60,000 90% 96% 100% 100% 96% 11% 18% 31% 29% 21% 
$75,000 97% 99% 100% 100% 99% 26% 43% 72% 72% 49% 
$100,000 99% 100% 100% 100% 100% 57% 78% 96% 96% 80% 
Source: RTBA unit record files and relevant budget standard 
Table 19: Percentage of affordable rental properties by region, Melbourne, couple, 2010 
Income 
LCBS 30% disposable income 
Inner Middle Outer Fringe Melb. Inner Middle Outer Fringe Melb. 
$0 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 4% 8% 11% 8% 7% 
$10,000 4% 8% 12% 8% 8% 11% 17% 29% 28% 19% 
$20,000 15% 25% 45% 44% 30% 13% 21% 39% 37% 25% 
$30,000 28% 46% 76% 76% 52% 19% 30% 53% 53% 36% 
$40,000 44% 68% 92% 91% 71% 21% 33% 59% 60% 40% 
$50,000 57% 78% 96% 96% 80% 7% 12% 19% 17% 13% 
$60,000 85% 94% 99% 99% 94% 19% 30% 53% 53% 36% 
$75,000 96% 98% 100% 100% 98% 38% 61% 88% 88% 65% 
$100,000 99% 100% 100% 100% 100% 67% 85% 98% 98% 86% 
Source: RTBA unit record files and relevant budget standard 
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Table 20: Percentage of affordable rental properties by region, Melbourne, couple with 
two children, 2010 
Income 
LCBS 30% disposable income 
Inner Middle Outer Fringe Melb. Inner Middle Outer Fringe Melb. 
$0 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 14% 52% 61% 38% 
$10,000 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 4% 29% 75% 80% 55% 
$20,000 2% 4% 14% 22% 12% 5% 37% 82% 86% 62% 
$30,000 2% 11% 43% 53% 32% 5% 42% 86% 89% 65% 
$40,000 3% 21% 66% 72% 48% 6% 45% 88% 90% 68% 
$50,000 16% 69% 97% 97% 81% 10% 59% 95% 95% 76% 
$60,000 40% 87% 99% 99% 90% 16% 69% 97% 97% 81% 
$75,000 75% 95% 100% 100% 96% 22% 78% 98% 98% 85% 
$100,000 91% 98% 100% 100% 99% 19% 73% 98% 98% 83% 
Source: RTBA unit record files and relevant budget standard 
In summary, the application of the residual income model to private rental draws out 
broadly similar findings to those of purchase: 
 Over a certain income level, singles have more capacity to afford rental 
accommodation than families. 
 Families (represented in the modelling by a couple and two children) have a much 
greater affordability problem than suggested by the 30 per cent rule. 
 Below certain income levels (containing still sizeable numbers of households, as 
Figure 13 indicates), there is no accommodation available in Melbourne that is 
affordable. 
 While not as marked as purchase, the rental market is more affordable in outer 
and fringe areas, and this is where all households have greater choice once a 
certain income level is achieved. 
 The inner city and middle ring are highly problematic in terms of affordable 
housing. 
 Families are constrained in choice, not just because of rent levels but also type of 
dwelling. Part of the reason for families having little choice in inner areas is the 
application of the Canadian National Occupancy Standard to the data which 
assumes it is inappropriate for families to live in one and two-bedroom 
accommodation. 
The implications of these findings are discussed in Section 9. 
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8 SOCIAL HOUSING 
One of the other objectives of this study was to test the appropriateness of the 
residual income model for social housing rent setting. 
Social housing in Australia comprises a number of sectors: public housing, community 
housing including the growth associations, Indigenous housing and affordable 
housing. The largest sector by far is public housing, and the rental system within this 
sector has largely become the norm for the others. However, each sector differs in 
some way from this norm and together they illustrate a range of possible variations to 
rental systems within social housing in response to different financial, social and 
political imperatives. 
The current public housing rent-setting structure around Australia is a household rent, 
usually referred to as a ‘rebated rent’ or an ‘income related rent’, which is based on 
the income of each tenant. While the formula used to calculate household rents varies 
between state housing authorities, most apply an upper benchmark of 25 per cent (up 
to 30% in New South Wales) of income. However, the treatment of Centrelink family 
payments and the income of other residents can vary, which means that there can be 
variations around the upper benchmark for different household types. For those on 
higher incomes there is also a property rent in the form of a quasi-market rent which 
represents the upper limit that a household can pay. 
Rent setting in social housing (predominantly public housing until the 1990s) has 
traced a complex history of property and household rents, with cost rents being 
dominant for most households until the 1980s but overlaid by a household rent for 
those whose circumstances had changed and who could no longer pay a cost rent 
(McNelis & Burke 2005). In earlier years, household rents varied around much lower 
benchmarks than at present, but with financial viability increasingly threatened by the 
greater targeting that started in the 1980s (accelerating greatly from the mid-1990s), 
these were slowly pushed up to their current 25 per cent. The financial viability 
problem derives from the fact that the cost of the rebate (the difference between 
market-derived rents and household rents) is largely the direct responsibility of state 
housing authorities, with neither Commonwealth nor state governments reimbursing 
them for the difference between property rents and household rents. 
Australia, New Zealand and the USA are the only developed societies operating a 
household rent which keeps rents for individual households to some defined 
benchmark (McNelis & Burke 2005). Most others charge only a property rent, with 
eligible tenants receiving a housing allowance calibrated according to different types 
and sizes of households and different regional rents using implicit benchmarks. This 
aims to achieve the intended level of affordability for groups of households with 
common characteristics rather than as a function of the particular circumstances of 
individual households. And, by virtue of the housing agency receiving a property rent 
that covers costs, there are not the financial pressures which Australian social 
housing agencies, most crucially public agencies, confront in striking a balance 
between financial viability and household affordability. In Australia this is not an easy 
balance as there is no guarantee that the high benchmark (25% to 30%) required for 
financial viability will guarantee affordability for households, particularly given that, as 
this report has stressed, benchmark rents do not recognise the different expenditure 
requirements of different household types. 
Table 21 below illustrates the problem for housing agencies. This shows, for a range 
of household types and different combinations of age and children, the relevant 
statutory income (column 4) and budget standard (LCBS). By deducting the LCBS 
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from the residual income, the difference in principle is what should be available for 
rent. With the exception of older couples and sole parents with one or two young 
children, the statutory benefit is not enough to meet the budget standard, let alone pay 
rents. This would suggest that, for these family types, rents should be set at zero. 
If Table 6 did not highlight this point sufficiently (69% of public tenants were below the 
LCBS), Table 21 does. This table shows for four household types and different age 
combinations of children the statutory income (column 4) and the actual budget 
standard (column 5). For singles (40 years of age), couples (same) and couples with 
two children, the statutory benefit is not enough to meet the budget standard, let alone 
pay rents. This in part is a function of indexing, given that statutory incomes are 
indexed by the CPI and the budget standard by the composite index method, with the 
latter increasing at a more rapid rate than the CPI. Accepting this method of indexing 
would suggest that, for these family types, rents should be set at zero and for the 
others at no more than $124 (for older couples). If a CPI measure was used, the 
LCBS would be reduced by around 15 per cent (see Appendix 2), but even this would 
produce rents that are below current household rents for most household types. 
Some, including one of this report’s authors (Burke 2005), have suggested extending 
rent assistance to public housing tenants and this would certainly help the financial 
status of housing agencies (so long as NAHA funds were not withdrawn in the same 
proportion). Some tenants on full Centrelink incomes would still find themselves in a 
difficult financial position while others, for example aged couples, would be quite 
financially comfortable, particularly compared to private renters in the same age and 
pension categories. 
Thus, in terms of the objective of testing the appropriateness of the residual income 
model for social housing rent setting, the answer is simple: it would not work for social 
housing agencies although it would work for most tenants. If rents were set at the 
budget standard for public housing, the levels that they would be set at for tenant 
affordability would greatly worsen the financial viability for housing agencies. Into the 
bargain, a residual income rent remains a household rent, with all its administrative 
costs and work disincentive implications of a household rent that changes as income 
changes. 
Table 21: Statutory incomes compared to LCBS for various household types, 2010 
1 2 3 4 5 6 







rent (4-5)  
Single 40 
 




$351 $276 75 
Couple 40, 40 
 




$529 $405 124 
Couple, 1 child 40, 40 8 $566 $562 4 
Couple, 2 children 40, 40 8, 10 $659 $664 -5 
Couple, 3 children 40, 40 8, 10, 12 $759 $756 3 
Sole parent,  
1 child 
40 8 $398 $353 45 
Sole parent,  
2 children 
40 8, 10 $492 $473 19 
Source: Centrelink 2010 LCBS modelling 
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This does not invalidate the residual income method for getting a more subtle 
understanding of the household-specific implications of the current rent-setting model. 
Thus, not all tenants are on a maximum Centrelink income, many will combine 
elements of such an income with other income sources, and some will be on full 
employed incomes. Table 21 repeats the above exercise for households on Victorian 
Office of Housing maximum income eligibility and shows what rent they could afford to 
pay using the LCBS (column 8). This highlights the problem of a household rent on a 
relatively flat percentage amount. Those on very low incomes may be paying an 
excessive amount on rents and not leaving enough for other expenditure, while those 
on higher incomes in most cases have more than enough to live on after paying the 
25 per cent household rent (as compared with what they would be paying with the 
LCBS). Sole parents in particular are doing relatively nicely. On the other hand, the 
household rent for couples with large families (four children) appears too harsh and 
does not leave enough to meet the LCBS. They are $68 out of pocket, whereas sole 
parents have between $285 and $190 more relative to what the LCBS rent would be, 
depending on the number of children. 
Table 22: Victorian Office of Housing maximum income eligibility, household rent and 








































$470 $276 $194 $118 76 
Couple 40, 40 
 




$816 $405 $411 $204 207 
Couple, 1 
child 
40,40 8 $850 $562 $288 $212 76 
Couple, 2 
children 
40,40 8,10 $884 $664 $220 $221 1 
Couple, 3 
children 
40,40 8,10,12 $918 $756 $162 $230 -68 
Sole parent,  
1 child 
40 8 $850 $353 $497 $212 285 
Sole parent,  
2 children 
40 8,10 $884 $473 $411 $221 190 
In the interests of vertical equity (between lower and higher income tenants in public 
housing), this would suggest an increase in the proportion of rent required for each 
household type as income increases. While superficially equitable, such a rent 
increase creates a potentially greater welfare trap by virtue of the workforce 
disincentive build in to sharper rent tapers. It would also be even more 
administratively burdensome than the current model and, as targeting bears its impact 
on tenancy mix over time and more and more households are at the low end of the 
income range, for example 100 per cent Centrelink income dependent, then any 
restructuring of rents along these lines would probably be financially problematic for 
social housing agencies. This would likely occur because the proportion of 
households requiring a rent increase and contributing to revenue would be more than 
negated by those requiring a reduction. In short, this exploration of the implications of 
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the residual income model only adds to the evidence that the current mix of a flat 25 
per cent household rent and a market rent is highly problematic for tenants and 
housing organisations. 
Turning to the NRAS, the budget standard model as applied to its income limits 
suggests that the scheme is very well targeted as the point of eligibility. Table 23 
below shows the initial income limits for NRAS eligibility for selected household types 
as of June 2010. Initial eligibility is the maximum amount for a relevant household at 
the point of allocation of a property (column 5). There is also an upper limit as to how 
much the income can increase by over a two-year period without having to vacate an 
NRAS property, but that is not relevant to the assessment of initial targeting. 
The table shows the residual income measure for each household type (column 5) 
and deducts this from column 6 to produce an amount that would be the desired rent 
to meet MCBS requirements. The MCBS estimates (which would exclude CRA) would 
appear to be close to the market rents less 25 per cent in most capital cities. For 
example, looking at a childless couple in their 40s, the MCBS rent (the amount they 
should pay as CRA goes to the provider) is $284. In Melbourne in December 2010 the 
median rent for a two-bedroom flat was $340. Discounted by 25 per cent as required 
by NRAS, the rent is $255, not too far from what the LCBS would suggest. For a large 
family (couple with four children) the 75 per cent discounted median December rent 
for a four-bedroom house is $290 and the LCBS suggests they should be paying 
$305—again very close. If only public housing, and perhaps by default community 
housing, rent could be as well targeted to what households can actually afford! Into 
the bargain, the NRAS rent structure (being a discounted market rent) has no inbuilt 
work disincentives. 




























681 397 284 
Single 65  681 382 299 
Couple 40, 40  $894 $610 $284 
 65, 65  $894 $555 $339 
Couple, 1 child 40, 40 8 $1,152 $816 $336 
Couple, 2 children 40, 40 8, 10 $1,356 $988 $368 
Couple, 3 children 40, 40 8, 10,1 2 $1,554 $1,249 $305 
Sole parent, 1 child 40 8 $928 $572 $356 
Sole parent, 2 
children 
40 8, 10 $1,193 
$781 $412 
60/40% Couple 40, 40  $970 $610 $360 
 65, 65  $970 $555 $415 
Couple, 1 child 40, 40 8 $1,204 $816 $388 
Couple, 2 children 40, 40 8, 10 $1,430 $988 $442 
Couple, 3 children 40, 40 8, 10, 12 $1,655 $1,249 $406 
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9 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
By its nature, this study was not designed to have a direct policy focus. The intention 
was to explore the viability of an alternative method of measuring affordability (the 
residual income method) to the ubiquitous 30 per cent benchmark method and to look 
at how this might enrich our understanding around a range of affordability and housing 
market issues. The work has been exploratory but reveals both the potential and the 
limitations of the method. 
For a broad measure of affordability (i.e. the scale of problems across all households), 
the residual method provides results not too dissimilar to the benchmark method (12.6 
% residual income, 14.3% benchmark method) and, given the ease which the latter 
can be constructed and the complications with the residual method, we would 
recommend its continued use. 
However, in terms of compositional elements where the results are affected by the 
type of households and their different expenditure and the make-up of these 
household types in different tenures, then the residual income method is likely to be 
more accurate in terms of the actual household experience. It is obvious, for example, 
that large families will have higher expenses than smaller ones and that this will affect 
their capacity to pay for housing. 
This report offers no broad overall conclusions other than that above. Instead, there 
are conclusions specific to each section and to the key questions to be addressed by 
the study. The conclusions are thus pulled together in relation to these questions and 
in part serve as a summary of results and in part an indicator of policy directions. 
Some are speculative as it has to be remembered that this is not a full blown study of 
all household types and all housing markets, but rather of a few case study 
households and two metropolitan locations. 
9.1 Using the method to measure the scale and form of the 
problem 
If we accept the residual income method as a complement to the benchmark, what 
are some of the key findings in terms of the first objective set for its use, that is, to 
calculate the distribution of housing affordability by household type, tenure, income, 
state and type of purchasers? 
1. For the lowest 40 per cent of household income earners, the 30/40 rule actually 
understates the affordability problem. If we already thought it was bad, it is 
actually worse, with the residual method showing 31 per cent of all Australian 
households having an affordability problem. The degree to which this is a housing 
cost versus an income distribution problem cannot be determined via this 
research, although the residual income model could be used to show how 
manipulations of housing costs or incomes could improve the financial position of 
different household types. 
It must be appreciated that in a highly marketised housing system with little not-
for-profit housing (around 95% of Australian housing is market provided), the 
percentages of lower income households with an affordability problem will always 
be high as markets can never get rents or house prices to levels affordable for 
such households. In the absence of a much larger not-for-profit sector, the 
challenge is working out the mix of supply side and demand side subsidies that 
can achieve the best affordability outcomes in the market sector. A starting point 
suggested by the residual income method is to focus on those household types 
and tenures that have the most intense affordability problems. 
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2. Lack of affordability is an obvious personal hardship for these families but what 
the findings hypothesise, given that almost a third of households have no 
spending discretion after meeting the necessities of life and housing costs, is that 
affordability may also be a drag on consumer spending and therefore on the 
economy. The households have not the capacity to save or to drive consumer 
spending. 
3. It is the rental sector where the affordability problem is most intensely felt. Of the 
779 853 lower 40 per cent income households, 51 per cent were renters, split 
relatively evenly between private and public sectors. 
4. The residual income method indicated that public renters can have an affordability 
problem, but this is as much about low income as about rents and highlights the 
problematic nature of social housing, particularly public housing, in Australia. 
Rents are too high for many tenants but not high enough for the housing 
organisations’ financial sustainability. Rental reform is necessary. 
5. Among private renters, the stand-out group are aged singles and couples. The 
numbers here are not huge and very few have the capacity to increase their 
income in old age. But as other AHURI studies have pointed out, the numbers will 
increase substantially over coming years. The solutions are always complex, 
requiring new supply side housing forms and financial models, but on the income 
side there is a strong case for some form of rent assistance top-up. We are only 
talking about some 50 000 households and thus an additional budgetary outlay of 
$125 million per annum if they were to receive another $50 a week. Ideally, such a 
‘s’ would have performance requirements, for example housing quality, attached 
to prevent exploitation. 
6. What the latter point reveals, however, and one alluded to throughout the study, is 
that the housing affordability problem is not just about housing costs. To expect 
solutions in the housing domain only will not address much of the problem. The 
relationships between income support programs and housing affordability 
outcomes, and labour market programs (whereby households can increase their 
earned income) and housing affordability, need greater understanding and 
potential review. 
9.2 How well or badly we perform in comparison to the USA 
1. This short section highlighted the importance of understanding the broad 
institutional environment when making comparisons between countries. While 
Australia may come up badly on very raw measures of affordability, a more fine-
grained analysis that looks at income support schemes, housing market structure, 
and household composition, may suggest that the situation is not as bad as it 
seems. That is certainly the case in the Victoria/Massachusetts comparison. The 
important point here is that this appears to have more to do with income support 
programs and income distribution than housing market performance, reaffirming 
point 5 above. 
2. Reinforcing the point made in Section 9.1, where Australia does have a worse 
affordability problem is for aged singles and couples. 
9.3 Modelling affordability capacity by household type 
1. The most important conclusion here is that the 30/40 method is not an adequate 
tool for understanding affordability and the housing market implications. Different 
household types have much greater capacity to participate in the housing market 
than others, and this is important in understanding market dynamics. 
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2. The residual method with a focus on specific household types can provide a better 
understanding of the compositional make-up of the affordability problem and 
suggests, among other things, the need for financial institution mortgage 
calculators that recognise the different expenditure attributes of different 
household types. 
3. Below some income point (varying for each household type), but in some cases 
(notably for families) higher than suggested by the 30/40 rule, no private market 
housing is affordable, whether rental or purchase. What the modelling suggests is, 
of course, consistent with the proportions of an affordability problem documented 
in Section 5 and in other AHURI studies. The obvious point is that policy initiative 
and reform is necessary, but what form this should take leaves considerable room 
for debate. 
4. Given the same income, singles and couples have much greater market capacity 
to work within the high house prices and rents of the inner city and middle ring 
suburbs and can purchase or rent at levels way beyond what the 30/40 rule would 
tell us. The development industry has already worked this out, which explains the 
proliferation of one and two-bedroom apartments in inner city and middle ring 
Melbourne in the last decade. 
5. The method enables the development of household-specific price points that can 
be used by industry or government to identity the targeting of affordable housing 
developments. This could be important where there is inclusionary zoning or 
simply in government (state and local) negotiations with developers to include 
some proportion of affordable housing. It provides a precise measure with 
underlying rationale to say what that is, which was not previously the case. 
6. By relating the affordability capacity to price points and then to the distribution of 
renters’ incomes, it is possible to get some assessment of the potential size of the 
first-time home purchase market. This exploratory exercise for the case study 
households would suggest that current prices are at a level where this market is 
very limited. We may have finally hit the affordability price wall. 
7. The residual income method suggests that it is families that face the greatest 
barriers to purchase, and yet for reasons such as the ontological security 
ownership provides it is probably more important to encourage ownership for this 
household type. One policy alternative is to target the FHOG to families only, 
capped at different income levels for family size. Thus, for couples with two 
children it could be capped at $100 000, as above that point there do not appear 
to be any difficulties for a household of this type purchasing. For three children it 
might be $105 000 and for one child $95 000, but with the residual income method 
providing the information to set the amounts more precisely. 
8. An alternative or complement might be the adaptation of rent assistance to a 
parallel home purchase assistance program where the same or similar amounts to 
CRA are made available to potential home purchasing households, but with 
eligibility targeted only to families (income capped as above) and only for a five-
year period (i.e. to get over the initial purchase hump), and most importantly as a 
contingent payment to be repaid on sale out of any capital gains. 
9.4 Affordability performance of home purchase markets on 
a spatial basis 
1. Using the Melbourne and Adelaide home purchase markets and applying the 
residual income affordability to actual dwelling prices, we were able to document 
the degree of market constraint for different household types. Lower income 
families (below $40 000) are out of the market completely; only at around $60 000 
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is there capacity to purchase, but then this applies only in outer suburbs and 
growth areas. Singles and couples had much less constrained choice and those 
with incomes below $80 000 were the only household type that could be first-time 
home buyers in inner city and middle ring suburbs. These observations have to be 
modified for second and subsequent purchasers who have built up a sizeable 
equity in their existing property. 
2. The differential choice of household types to purchase indicates a driver of spatial 
polarisation that, in the absence of any policy interventions, is no doubt likely to be 
sustained in the future. However, it is a nuanced polarisation, not simply one of 
lower versus higher income but also of household and housing type. The outer 
suburbs as a whole will not become dominated by low income households as 
many of the larger households that are constrained or choose to live in such areas 
because of their greater affordability and more appropriate dwellings (houses 
rather than flats) still have objectively good incomes of $75 000 plus. In 15 years 
or so, when these households’ mortgages reduce relative to hopefully rising 
incomes, they will have substantial discretionary income to spend on goods and 
services in these areas. And many who traced the same housing career a decade 
or more ago probably already have. 
This means that the outer suburbs will not trace the path of US inner cities where 
concentrations of low income households undermine the viability of local industry 
and create a pathway to concentrations of spatial disadvantage. This may occur in 
limited areas of Australian outer suburbs where the particular nature of the stock, 
that is, tired six-pack apartments, run-down detached dwellings and, in some 
cases, ex-public housing stock, will attract ‘slum’ landlords, low income 
purchasers and renters. These areas should be identified, the processes causing 
change better understood and potential interventions designed. 
Conversely, these processes do not mean that the inner and middle ring areas of 
our cities are going to be concentrations of high income households. The growing 
proportion of multi-unit accommodation that will be occupied by singles and 
couples will ensure this. To purchase in such areas, these household types only 
need an income much the same as, or even less than, the income needed by 
larger households to purchase in the outer areas. Across Melbourne there may be 
relatively even distribution of household incomes, but with very different household 
compositions. 
What will certainly occur, and is already occurring, in response to the current 
market affordability is a polarisation of dwelling form and household type. Inner 
city and middle ring housing will be increasingly dominated by multi-unit 
development, often high rise and targeted at small households, while outer and 
growth areas will be dominated by detached houses marketed at larger 
households and only occasionally relieved by a small pocket of multi-unit housing. 
3. The unintended side effect of the polarisation could be an inability for many outer 
urban detached home owners to trade down or across. There has been a growing 
assumption (in many countries, now undermined by the global financial crisis) that 
home ownership could be a de facto form of welfare policy in that older 
households could sell their outright owned property, trade down to a smaller 
dwelling and have the residual as an income stream or de facto pension. In a 
spatially divided housing market this will have only limited potential as already the 
cost of apartments in the areas where they are largely available (inner city and 
middle ring) are equal to or exceed outer urban detached housing. And in the 
outer urban areas of Melbourne such is the focus on the larger household (family 
market) that there is very limited construction of multi-unit housing. For example, 
in 2009, of 17 628 dwelling permits for construction projects in these areas, 98.4 
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per cent were for detached dwellings (Victorian Building Commission 2010). 
Households in outer areas will not even be able to trade across to a more suitable 
dwelling form as their housing circumstances change. 
4. Until the outer urban households’ children leave home, or the households have 
very large increases in income to sustain a much larger mortgage and/or build 
very substantial equity, they are effectively trapped in space with little prospect of 
moving into the inner and middle suburbs, such is the gap between what they can 
afford and the value of dwellings in outer urban areas relative to those in the inner 
city and middle ring areas. Compared to the housing market in Melbourne in the 
1945–80 period when affordability was fairly uniform across space, the now 
spatially constrained housing market is potentially limiting labour market mobility 
(many people are less able to move around metropolitan areas) or accentuating 
car use as many whose jobs are in inner urban locations are forced to live further 
away from where they work and where there is poor public transport. Both 
represent problems for urban sustainability. 
5. A locking-in of two distinctively different residential construction industries 
whereby there is a sector of small or contract builders specialising in the 
techniques of single unit housing construction and a commercial multi-unit sector 
specialising in four or more storeys, with the former tending to only operate in the 
outer area and the latter only in the inner, where they both know their relevant 
markets and the building techniques and funding mechanisms to make their 
products work in those markets. In addition to the demand side constraints on 
creating a more diverse housing form in the outer areas, this may create a supply 
side constraint with few multi-unit builders with the interest or expertise to venture 
into the outer areas. As Newton et al. (2011) observe, there is a shortage of high 
quality low rise median density development in Australian cities, in part because 
this specialisation of the two residential construction sectors. 
In US and Canadian cities, the latter type of development where there might be 
hundreds of townhouses and low rise apartments designed around community 
facilities is not uncommon in outer and growth areas. But the dynamics of the 
Australian housing market, much of it arguably driven by the affordability patterns 
documented above, create a barrier to the emergence of such a development 
form. 
9.5 Affordability performance of rental housing on a spatial 
basis 
1. The rental affordability patterns reaffirm the problem of increasingly polarised 
urban form. As more and more renters, notably families, are pushed to outer 
urban areas, the response will come from landlords buying up existing stock of 
detached dwellings. In the absence of either carrots or sticks, the process will not 
drive much new purpose-built rental accommodation, particularly multi-unit 
housing. The rental drivers will reinforce the homogeneity of dwelling form in such 
areas. 
2. The inability of low to moderate income households to afford inner city and middle 
ring housing is highly problematic. These were the areas where such households 
traditionally found accommodation and it is also where the services they use and 
the sectors they may work in, for example security, cleaning and hospitality, are 
disproportionately located. Many would argue it was their residence in these areas 
that created the social and economic mix that made such areas attractive. It is 
important that low cost rental stock be retained in such areas, and programs such 
as the NRAS are very significant in terms of achieving this, but affordable housing 
providers in these areas will always confront the land cost barrier, and 
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Commonwealth programs cannot be expected to deal with this. The low cost 
rental shortage in such areas is a rationale not only for inclusionary zoning, but for 
the formation of a regional authority with the responsibility for land amalgamation 
and planning coordination, including around affordable rental provision, and for 
some flexibility in the central agency requirement that government land (of which 
there are still considerable holdings in inner areas) should be sold at full market 
value. 
3. The findings simply reaffirm the need for more social housing, given the clear 
market failure in the private rental sector. 
9.6 Implications for social housing 
1. Besides documenting the need for social and affordable housing, the study also 
suggests that the current household rent used in public housing (Victoria being the 
example) is neither here nor there; it neither provides housing agencies with a 
sustainable rent nor does it provide an affordable rent for many tenants. In 
addition, the way it is structured means that some households benefit more than 
others. A household rent based on the residual income method is not the answer 
as it too has its problems, but it could be used to provide information for a different 
type of rent (e.g. a fixed cost rent by household type and size modified for location 
and dwelling quality). In short, a restructuring of rent accompanied by a new 
funding model is essential for the sustainability and equity objectives of social 
housing. 
2. The analysis does raise the question of whether there could be a parallel program 
aimed at home purchase. If eligible households could get the $9100 per annum 
indexed as a household subsidy (it could be targeted, e.g. at key professions that 
receive low pay, e.g. the human services sector), many NRAS households would 
be able to afford home purchase. There would need to be conditions. It could only 
be for a new dwelling and therefore increases supply, and importantly the funds 
provided would in effect be contingent loans to be repaid out of capital gains when 
the property is sold. This would enable households to build equity and have the 
other ontological advantages of ownership but without great long-term cost to 
government. Alternatively or in addition, a scheme could be targeted at housing 
growth providers, but for sale not rental. Purchasers would buy in at a discount on 
the market price, but the property could only be sold back to the growth provider 
on a formula that kept the stock at below market values. Again, the objective of 
such a national affordable home purchase scheme is to enable households to 
build equity and have ontological security while simultaneously increasing the 
affordable housing stock. It could replace the FHOG and therefore use the same 
budget allocation but provide better outcomes. 
9.7 Overall conclusion 
While exploratory, the findings in this report suggest the usefulness of the residual 
income method as a basis for more informed decision-making around affordability 
issues and for more detailed analysis of the implications. The analysis is far from 
exhaustive and more work needs to be done in extending it to more households and 
working through in greater detail the implications for market behaviour. 
One of the model’s limitations is the complexity in creating it, and thus this Final 
Report is accompanied by a template of the model to enable any agency or individual 
to undertake residual income analysis based on whatever assumptions of gross 
income, interest rates, deposits, taxation, pensions, benefits and allowances are 
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Appendix 1: Summary of assumptions and methods in 
building budget standard models 
This appendix outlines in some detail the features of the model and how taxes and 
benefits are incorporated into it, using the examples of two household types: a single 
person and a couple with two children. 
1. The model provides multiple indicators of affordability: 
The model allows for a number of different applications. For home purchase they are: 
a. maximum affordable mortgage payment 
b. maximum affordable mortgage loan 
c. maximum affordable purchase price 
d. share of houses sold in 2010 that were affordable. 
For rental they are: 
e. maximum affordable rent 
f. share of houses rented in 2010 that were affordable. 
2. Affordability for a broad range of incomes: 
The method allows for calculation of affordability indicators for a very large income 
spectrum. For renters it starts at $10 000, but in home purchase the starting income is 
$30 000 as it is assumed that purchase is not affordable below this level. Incomes are 
at $1000 intervals of gross annual household income up to $150 000. 
3. Affordability for two case study household types: 
Necessarily the residual income model is household-specific as that is one of its 
characteristic features (i.e. the ability to reveal that different household types have 
very different expenditures and therefore very different abilities to borrow). There are 
many types once permutations of marital status and number of children are taken into 
account. For the purpose of this study, we concentrated on two indicative types: 
a. single adult, no children 
b. couple, two children. 
4. Affordability based upon two residual income non-housing standards: 
The development of a residual income model of housing affordability requires 
indicative budget standards for different household types. Australia is fortunate to 
have the two standards developed by the SPRC at the University of New South Wales 
(Saunders et al. 1998): 
a. low cost budget standard (LCBS) non-housing elements indexed for price 
changes 
b. modest but adequate budget standard (MCBS) non-housing elements indexed 
for price changes. 
These budget standards are indicative and some elements have been questioned, 
notably child care costs and housing costs (DFaCs 2007). The housing estimates are 
not relevant for this study as they emerge as a residual from the other data, and the 
child care methodological issues are not so great as to change the expenditure 
estimates in a way that could invalidate the findings here. There are also certain 
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consumption items whose importance has changed over time (e.g. mobile phones, 
broadband) and these have been factored into the final analysis, along with a 
measure of debt which has also increased greatly since the SPRC study. The MCBS 
assumes a monthly broadband charge of $20 and a mobile phone charge of $20. 
There is also the problem with the SPRC budget standards that they assume 
expenditures are very similar across Australia. This would certainly be the case in 
capital cities and adjacent regional areas, but there are parts of Australia, for example 
remote areas or resource intensive areas (often one and the same), where many 
items by virtue of transport costs or high commercial rents are much dearer. The 
model therefore cannot have applicability in such areas. 
5. User-set parameters to test market conditions as well as index over time: 
The budget standards were developed in the late 1990s and therefore the parameters 
of any measures or indicators based on them have to be adapted for current 
circumstances. These include: 
a. indexing to relevant time period by a composite index of 50 per cent household 
disposable income and 50 per cent CPI 
b. mortgage loan-to-value ratio of 80 per cent 
c. mortgage loan term (25 years) 
d. mortgage interest rates (rates for June of relevant year) 
e. mortgage establishment costs, for example stamp duty, legal (rates for relevant 
year). 
6. Income assumptions: 
a. For two-adult households, 60 per cent of total income is assumed to be from 
adult male employment and 40 per cent from adult female employment. It is 
assumed that no other family members’ income is relevant for loan eligibility or is 
used in rental payments. 
7. Income tax computations: 
a. Income tax rates are based on personal tax rates for the 2009–10 financial 
year. 
b. Tax rates are based on withholding rates for pay-as-you-go and do not include 
amounts credited or debited for taxation financial reconciliation such as the 
Medicare levy or low income tax offset. The computations also exclude tax 
deductions that are household-specific, such as those for length of tax year, 
higher education payments and the private health insurance offset. However, 
there are a number of income-based tax credits and benefits that are not 
household-specific. 
8. Income-based tax benefits and credits: 
The value of the following benefits has been computed, with the specifics differing by 
household type as Table A1 below shows and the accompanying text explains further. 
Consistent with Australian government policy, Newstart is based on disposable 
income while Family Tax Benefits are based on annual gross income. These are 




Table A1: Relevant tax benefits and credits for sample household types 
Household type Newstart Family Tax Benefit 
Part A 
Family Tax Benefit 
Part B 
Single person √ X X 
Sole parent, 1 child √ √ √ 
Couple, no children √ X X 
Couple, 2 children √ √ √ 
9. Modelling adjustment for specific household types 
a. Sole person household: Not eligible for Family Tax Benefits, and for 
purchasers the $30 000 income cut-off means that no single persons are eligible 
for Newstart as it ceases at a disposable income of $853.34 per fortnight for 
single persons. Lowering of the cut-off below this requires computation of 
Newstart for this household group. 
b. Couple household with two children: Eligible for Newstart up to $45 000. Family 
Tax Benefit Part A (FTBA) of $313.88 per fortnight is paid in full until combined 
income reaches $44 165 and then decreases on a sliding scale until the upper 
limit of $107 000. Maximum payment for Family Tax Benefit Part B (FTBB) is 
$93.10 per fortnight, based on the ‘non-primary earner’ if the primary earner’s 
annual income is below $150 000. As it is based on the income of the non-
primary earner, FTBB is no longer paid once the couple’s combined income 




Appendix 2: Testing of different indexing methods 
Figure A1: Comparisons of outcomes for different indexing methods for the budget 
standard 
 
Appendix 2 shows what would be the effect of choosing different indices for the 
budget standard. The household disposable index (HDI) would increase it at a much 
greater rate than the all groups CPI. Thus 13 years from the base year of 1997 the 
HDI is 35 per cent higher than the all groups CPI. This is because the former relates 
only to income increases and takes no account of expenditures. Choosing this would 
exaggerate the degree of affordability problems. On the other hand, the all groups 
index includes housing and the budget standard as used for the purposes of this study 
excludes housing and financial expenditures, and thus that is not an appropriate 
measure. Thus, the relevant expenditure index should be the CPI all groups minus 
housing. The problem with this measure, however, is that it does not take into account 
any change in tastes as incomes rise or new products emerge in response to greater 
affluence (e.g. mobile phone use and broadband). The compromise was to create a 
‘shandy index’ which is half of the rate of the increase of the HDI and half that of the 




Appendix 3: Regions of Melbourne 
Appendix 3 shows the local government areas that make up the regional boundaries 
used in the figures and tables of Section 6.3. These are regions used by the Victorian 
Department of Planning and Communities. 
Inner: Yarra, Stonnington, Port Phillip, Melbourne. 
Middle: Manningham, Bayside, Hobsons Bay, Moonee Valley, Banyule, Maribyrnong, 
Kingston, Whitehorse, Darebin, Monash, Moreland, Boroondara, Glen Eira. 
Outer: Nillumbik, Knox, Maroondah, Greater Dandenong, Frankston, Brimbank. 





Appendix 4: Calculating affordable rent and rent assistance 
Households who pay a rent above a threshold rent and receive a Centrelink payment 
(such as a pension, allowance or more than the base rate of Family Tax Benefit Part 
A) are eligible for rent assistance. The amount depends upon the type of household, 
the rent paid above the threshold rent, and the rent assistance rate (currently 75c for 
every $1 above the threshold rent) up to the maximum amount of rent assistance. In 
the model, the affordable rent is the disposable income after other expenses plus rent 
assistance. Rent assistance is calculated in a way which maximises the level of rent 
assistance paid. The formula for calculating the affordable rent is as follows:  
1. If disposable income is less than the threshold rent for the household type, the 
affordable rent is the disposable income (and no rent assistance is paid).  
2. If disposable income is above the rent at which maximum rent assistance is paid, 
the affordable rent is the disposable income plus the maximum rent assistance for 
that household type (and the maximum rent assistance is paid).  
3.  If disposable income is between the threshold rent and the rent at which 
maximum rent assistance is paid, the affordable rent is calculated as the 
disposable income (DI) less the threshold rent (Rth) multiplied by rent assistance 
rate (r), divided by 1 minus the rent assistance rate (r), that is, (DI-Rth x r)/(1-r) 
(and rent assistance is the difference between the affordable rent and disposable 
income). In other words, the rent is proportioned appropriately, depending on 
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